Showing posts with label European Banking Union. Show all posts
Showing posts with label European Banking Union. Show all posts

Friday, October 6, 2017

Friday, April 15, 2016

15/4/16: Banking Union, Competition and Banking Sector Concentration


One of the key changes in recent years across the entire U.S. economy has been growth in market concentration (lower competition) and regulatory burden increases in a number of sector, including banking. A good summary of the matter is provided here: http://www.americanactionforum.org/research/market-concentration-grew-obama-administration/ .


However, an interesting chart based on the U.S. Fed data, shows that even with these changes U.S. banking sector remains relatively more competitive than in other advanced economies:


Source: @HPSInsight

Interestingly, European banks are also becoming more regional, as opposed to global, players as discussed here: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2016/03/the-us-is-beginning-to-dominate-global-investment-banking-implications-for-europe.html

Chart next shows market shares of the European Investment Banking markets accruing to banks originating in the following jurisdictions:


Source: @NakedCapitalism

As an argument goes: “Deutsche Bank and Barclays are the only Europeans left in the top seven for the EMEA market. But they are likely to lose their positions because Deutsche Bank is currently undergoing a major reorganisation and Barclays is in the process of executing the Vickers split. In the investment banking field, the only pan-European banks will all soon be American. This has the corollary, for good or bad, that European national and EU-level authorities, such as the European Commission, will have rather less direct control over them. A key part of the European financial system is slipping out of the grasp of the European authorities.

Which begs two questions:

Does Europe need more regulation-induced consolidation in the sector, aiming to make TBTF European banking giants even bigger and even less diversified globally, as the European Banking Union and European Capital Markets Union, coupled with increasing push toward greater regulatory constraints on Fintech sector are likely to do?

Or does Europe need more disruptive and more agile, as well as risk-diversified, smaller banking systems and more open innovation culture in banking and financial services?


Note: you can see my analysis of the European Capital Markets Union here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2592918

Friday, March 4, 2016

4/3/16: Can Cryan halt Deutsche Bank's decline? Euromoney


Recently, I wrote about the multiple problems faced by the Deutsche Bank (see post here http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/02/12216-deutsche-bank-crystallising.html).

Subsequently, Euromoney published a well-researched and wide-ranging article on the same subjects that is also worth reading, even though there are quite significant overlaps with my earlier post: http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3534126/Can-Cryan-halt-Deutsche-Banks-decline.html?single=true.


Friday, February 12, 2016

12/2/16: Deutsche Bank: Crystallising Europe’s TBTF Problems


This week was quite a tumultuous one for banks, and especially Europe’s champion of the ‘best in class’ TBTF institutions, Deutsche Bank. Here’s what happened in a nutshell.

Deutsche’s 6 percent perpetual bonds, CoCos (more on this below), with expected maturity in 2022, used to yield around 7 percent back in January. Having announced massive losses for fiscal year 2015 (first time full year losses were posted by the DB since 2008), Deutsche was under pressure in the equity markets. Rather gradual sell-off of shares in the bank from the start of 2015 was slowly, but noticeably eroding bank’s equity risk cushion. So markets started to get nervous of the second tier of ‘capital’ held by the bank - second in terms of priority of it being bailed in in the case of an adverse shock. This second tier is known as AT1 and it includes those CoCos.

Yields on CoCos rose and their value (price) fell. This further reduced Deutsche’s capital cushion and, more materially, triggered concerns that Deutsche will not be calling in 2022 bonds on time, thus rolling them over into longer maturity. Again, this increased losses on the bonds. These losses were further compounded by the market concerns that due to a host of legal and profit margins problems, Deutsche can suspend payments on CoCos coupons, if not in 2016, then in 2017 (again, more details on this below). Which meant that in markets view, shorter-term 2022 CoCos were at a risk of being converted into a longer-dated and zero coupon instrument. End of the game was: Coco’s prices fell from 93 cents to the Euro at the beginning of January, to 71-72 cents on the Euro on Monday this week.

When prices fall as much as Deutsche’s CoCos, investors panic and run for exit. Alas, dumping CoCos into the markets became a problem, exposing liquidity risks imbedded into CoCos structure. There are two reasons for the liquidity risk here: one is general market aversion to these instruments (a reversal of preferences yield-chasing strategies had for them before); and lack of market makers in CoCos (thin markets) because banks don’t like dealing in distressed assets of other banks. Worse, Asian markets were largely shut this week, limiting potential pool of buyers.

Spooked by shrinking valuations and falling liquidity of the Deutsche’s AT1 instruments, investors rushed into buying insurance against Deutsche’s default on senior bonds - the Credit Default Swaps or CDS. This propelled Deutsche’s CDS to their highest levels since the Global Financial Crisis. Deutsche’s CDS shot straight up and with their prices rising, implied probability of Deutsche’s default went through the roof, compounding markets panic.


Summing Up the Mess: Three Pillars of European Risks

Deutsche Bank AG is a massive, repeat - massive - banking behemoth. And the beast is in trouble.

Let’s do some numbers first. Take a rather technical test of systemic risk exposures by the banks, run by NYU Stern VLab. First number of interest: Systemic Risk calculation - the value of bank equity at risk in a case of systemic crisis (basically - a metric of how much losses a bank can generate to its equity holders under a systemic risk scenario).

Deutsche clocks USD91.623 billion hole relating to estimated capital shortfall after the existent capital cushion is exhausted. A wallop that is the third largest in the world and accounts for 7.23% of the entire global banking system losses in a systemic crisis.


Now, for volatility that Deutsche can transmit to the markets were things to go pear shaped. How much of a daily drop in equity value of the Deutsche will occur if the aggregate market falls more than 2%. The metric for this is called Marginal Expected Shortfall or MES and Deutsche clocks in respectable 4.59, ranking it 8th in the world by impact. In a sense, MSE is a ‘tail event’ beta - stock beta for times of significant markets distress.

How closely does Deutsche move with the market over time, without focusing just on periods of significant markets turmoil? That would be bank’s beta, which is the covariance of its stock returns with the market return divided by variance of the market return. Deutsche’s beta is 1.61, which is high - it is 7th highest in the world and fourth highest amongst larger banks and financial institutions, and it basically means that for 1% move in the market, on average, Deutsche moves 1.6%.

But worse: Deutsche leverage is extreme. Save for Dexia and Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, the two patently sick entities (one in a shutdown mode another hooked to a respirator), Deutsche is top of charts with leverage of 79.5:1.



Incidentally, this week, Deutsche credit risk surpassed that of another Italian behemoth, UniCredit:


So Deutsche is loaded with the worst form of disease - leverage and it is caused by the worst sort of underlying assets: the impenetrable derivatives (see below on that).


Overall, Deutsche problems can be divided into 3 categories:

  1. Legal
  2. Capital, and
  3. Leverage and quality of assets.

These problems plague all European TBTF banks ever since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis. The legacy of horrific misspelling of products, mis-pricing of risks and markets distortions by which European banks stand is contrasted by the rhetoric emanating from European regulators about ‘reforms’, ‘repairs’ and ‘renewed regulatory vigilance’ in the sector. In truth, as Deutsche’s saga shows, capital buffers fixes, applied by European regulators, have yielded nothing more than an attempt to powder over the miasma of complex, derivatives-laden asset books and equally complex, risk-obscuring structure of new capital buffers. It also highlights just how big of a legal mess European banks are, courtesy of decades of their maltreatment of their clients and markets participants.

So let’s start churning through them one-by-one.


The Saudi Arabia of Legal Problems

Deutsche has been slow to wake up and smell the roses on all various legal settlements other banks signed up to in years past. Deutsche has settled or paid fines of some USD9.3 billion to-date (from the start of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008), covering:

  • Charges of violations of the U.S. sanctions;
  • Interest rates fixing charges; and
  • Mortgages-Backed Securities (alleged) fraud with respect to the U.S. state-sponsored lenders: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.


And at the end of 2015, Deutsche has provided a set-aside funding for settling more of the same, to the tune of USD6 billion. So far, it faces:

  1. U.S. probe into Mortgages-Backed Securities it wrote and sold pre-crisis. If one goes by the Deutsche peers, the USD15.3 billion paid and set aside to-date is not going to be enough. For example, JP Morgan total cost of all settlements in the U.S. alone is in excess of USD23 billion. But Deutsche is a legal basket case compared to JPM-Chase. JPM, Bank of America and Citigroup paid around USD36 billion on their joint end. In January 2016, Goldman Sachs reached an agreement (in principle) with DofJustice to pay USD5.1 billion for same. Just this week (http://www.businessinsider.com/morgan-stanley-mortgage-backed-securities-settlement-2016-2) Morgan Stanley agreed to pay USD3.2 billion on the RMBS case. Some more details on this here: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-deutsche-bank-lawsuit-idUSKCN0VC2NY.
  2. Probes into currency manipulations and collusion on its trading desk (DB is the biggest global currency trader that is yet to settle with the U.S. DoJustice. In currency markets rigging settlement earlier, JPMorgan, Citicorp and four other financial institutions paid USD5.8 billion and entered guilty pleas already.
  3. Related to currency manipulations probe, DB is defending itself (along with 16 other financial institutions) in a massive law suit by pension funds and other investors. Deutsche says ‘nothing happened’. Nine out of the remaining 15 institutions are pushing to settle the civil suit for (at their end of things) USD2 billion. Keep in mind of all civil suit defendants - Deutsche is by far the largest dealer in currency markets.
  4. Probes in the U.S. and UK on its alleged or suspected role in channeling some USD10 billion of Russian money into the West;
  5. Worse, UK regulators are having a close watch on Deutsche Bank - in 2014, they placed it on the their "enhanced supervision" list, reserved for banks that have either gone through a systemic failure or are at a risk of such; a list that includes no other large banking institution on it, save for Deutsche.
  6. This is hardly an end to the Deutsche woes. Currently, it is among a group of financial institutions under the U.S. investigation into trading in the U.S. Treasury market, carried out by the Justice Department. 
  7. The bank is also under inquiries covering alleged fixings of precious metals benchmarks.
  8. The bank is even facing some legal problems relating to its operations (in particular hiring practices) in Asia. And it is facing some trading-related legal challenges across a number of smaller markets, as exemplified by a recent case in Korea (http://business.asiaone.com/news/deutsche-bank-trader-sentenced-jail).


You really can’t make a case any stronger: Deutsche is a walking legal nightmare with unknown potential downside when it comes to legal charges, costs and settlements. More importantly, however, it is a legal nightmare not because regulators are becoming too zealous, but because, like other European banks, adjusting for its size, it has its paws in virtually every market-fixing scandal. The history of European banking to-date should teach us one lesson and one lesson only: in Europe, honest, functioning and efficient markets have been seconded to manipulated, dominated by TBTF institutions and outright rigged structures more reminiscent of business environment of the Italian South, than of Nordic ‘regulatory havens’.




CoCo Loco

CoCos, Contingent Convertible Capital Instruments, are a hybrid form of capital instruments that are designed and structured to absorb losses in times of stress by automatically converting into equity should a bank experience a decline in its capital ratios below a certain threshold. Because they are a form of convertible debt, they are counted as Tier 1 capital instrument ‘additional’ Tier 1 instruments or AT1.

CoCos are also perpetual bonds with no set maturity date. Banks can be redeemed them on option, usually after 5 years, but banks can also be prevented by the regulators from doing so. The expectation that banks will redeem these bonds creates expectation of their maturity for investors and this expectation is driven by the fact that CoCos are more expensive to issue for the banks, creating an incentive for them to redeem these instruments. European banks love CoCos, in contrast to the U.S. banks that issue preferred shares as their Tier 1 capital boosters, because Europeans simply love debt. Debt in any form. It gives banks funding without giving it a headache of accounting to larger pools of equity holders, and it gives them priority over other liabilities. AT1 is loved by European regulators, because it sits right below T1 (Tier 1) and provides more safety to senior bondholders on whose shoulders the entire scheme of European Ponzi finance (using Minsky’s terminology) rests.

In recent years, Deutsche, alongside other banks was raising capital. Last year, Credit Suisse, went to the markets to raise some CHF6 billion (USD6.1 billion), Standard Chartered Plc raised about $5.1 billion. Bank of America got USD5 billion from Warren Buffett in August 2014. So in May 2014, Deutsche was raising money, USD 1.5 billion worth, for the second time (it tapped markets in 2013 too). The fad of the day was to issue CoCos - Tier 1 securities, known as Contingent Convertible Bonds. All in, European banks have issued some EUR91 billion worth of this AT1 capital starting from 2013 on.

Things were hot in the markets then. Enticed by a 6% original coupon, investors gobbled up these CoCos to the tune of EUR3.5 billion (the issue cover was actually EUR25 billion, so the CoCos were in a roaring demand). Not surprising: in the world of low interest rates, say thanks to the Central Banks, banks were driving investors to take more and more risk in order to get paid.

There was, as always there is, a pesky little wrinkle. CoCos are convertible to equity (bad news in the case of a bank running into trouble), but they are also carrying a little clause in their prospectus. Under Compulsory Cancelation of Interest heading, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Prospectus imposed deferral of interest payments on CoCos whenever CoCos payment of interest “together with any additional Distributions… that are simultaneously planned or made or that have been made by the issuer on the other Tier 1 instruments… would exceed the Available Distributable Items…” and/or “if and to the extent that the competent supervisory authority orders that all or part of the relevant payment of interest be cancelled…”

That is Prospectus-Speak for saying that CoCos can suspend interest payments per clauses, before the capital adequacy problems arise. The risks of such an event are not covered by Credit Default Swaps (CDS) which cover default risk for senior bonds.

The reason for this clause is that European regulators impose on the banks what is known as CRD (Combined Buffer Requirement and Maximum Distributable Amount) limits: If the bank total buffers fall below the Combined Buffer Requirement, then CoCos and other similar instruments do not pay in full. That is normal and the risk of this should be fully priced in all banks’ CoCos. But for Deutsche, there is also a German legal requirement to impose an additional break on bank’s capital buffers depletion: a link between specified account (Available Distributable Items) balance and CoCos pay-out suspension. This ADI account condition is even more restrictive than what is allowed under CRD.

This week, DB said they have some EUR1 billion available in 2016 to pay on EUR350 million interest coupon due per CoCos (due date in April). But few are listening to DB’s pleas - CoCos were trading at around 75 cents in the euro mark this week. The problem is that the markets are panicked not just by the prospect of the accounting-linked suspension of coupon payments, but also by the rising probability of non-redemption of CoCos in the near future - a problem plaguing all financials.

DB is at the forefront of these latter concerns, because of its legal problems and also because the bank is attempting to reshape its own business (the former problem covered above, the latter relates to the discussion below). DB just announced a massive EUR6.8 billion net loss for 2015 which is not doing any good to alleviate concerns about it’s ability to continue funding coupon payments into 2017. Unknown legal costs exposure of DB mean that DB-estimated expected funding capacity of some EUR4.3 billion in 2017 available to cover AT1 payments is based on its rather conservative expectation for 2016 legal costs and rather rosy expectations for 2016 income, including the one-off income from the 2015-agreed sale of its Chinese bank holdings.



Earlier this week, Standard & Poor’s, cut DB’s capital ratings on “concerns that Germany’s biggest lender could report a loss that would restrict its ability to pay on the obligations”. S&P cut DB’s Tier 1 securities from BB- to B+ from BB- and slashed perpetual Tier 2 instruments from BB to BB-.

Beyond all of this mess, Deutsche is subject to the heightened uncertainty as to the requirements for capital buffers forward - something that European banks co-share. AT 1 stuff, as highlighted above, is one thing. But broader core Tier 1 ratio in 4Q 2015 was 11.1%, which is down on 11.5% in 4Q 2014. In its note cutting CoCos rating, S&P said that “The bank's final Tier 1 interest payment capacity for 2017 will depend on its actual net earnings in 2016 as well as movements in other reserves.” Which is like saying: “Look, things might work out just fine. But we have no visibility of how probable this outcome is.” Not assuring…

DB is also suffering the knock-on effect of the general gloom in the European debt markets. Based on Bloomberg data, high yield corporate bonds issuance in Europe is down some 78 percent in recent months, judging by underwriters fees. These woes relate to European banks outlook for 2016, which links to growth concerns, net interest margin concerns and quality of assets concerns.


Badsky Loansky: A Eurotown’s Bad Bear?

Equity and debt markets repricing of Deutsche paper is in line with a generally gloomy sentiment when it comes to European banks.

The core reason is that aided by the ECB’s QE, the banks have been slow cleaning their acts when it comes to bad loans and poor quality assets. European Banking Authority estimates that European banks hold some USD 1.12 trillion worth of bad loans on their books. These primarily relate to the pre-crisis lending. But, beyond this mountain of bad debt, we have no idea how many loans are marginal, including newly issued loans and rolled over credit. How much of the current credit pool is sustained by low interest rates and is only awaiting some adverse shock to send the whole system into a tailspin? Such a shock might be borrowers’ exposures to the US dollar credit, or it might be companies exposure to global growth environment, or it might be China unwinding, or all three. Not knowing is not helpful. Oil price collapse, for example, is hitting hard crude producers. Guess who were the banks’ favourite customers for jumbo-sized corporate loans in recent years (when oil was above USD50pb)? And guess why would any one be surprised that with global credit markets being in a turmoil, Deutsche’s fixed income (debt) business would be performing badly?

Deutsche and other european banks are caught in a dilemma. Low rates on loans and negative yields on Government bonds are hammering their profit margins (based on net interest margin - the difference between their lending rate and their cost of raising funds). Solution would be to raise rates on loans. But doing so risks sending into insolvency and default their marginal borrowers. Meanwhile, the pool of such marginal borrowers is expanding with every drop in oil prices and every adverse news from economic growth front. So the magic potion of QE is now delivering more toxicity to the system than good, and yet, the system requires the potion to flow on to sustain itself.

Again, this calls in Minsky: his Ponzi finance thesis that postulates that viability of leveraged financial system can only be sustained by rising capital valuations. When capital valuations stop growing faster than the cost of funding, the system collapses.

In part to address the market sentiment, Deutsche is talking about deploying the oldest trick in the book: buying out some of its liabilities - err… senior bonds (not CoCos) - at a discount in the markets to the tune of EUR5 billion across two programmes. If it does, it will hit own liquidity in the short run, but it will also (probably or possibly) book a profit and improve its balance sheet in the longer term. The benefits are in the future, and the only dividend hoped-for today is a signalling value of a bank using cash to buy out debt. Which hinges on the return of the markets to some sort of the ‘normal’ (read: renewed optimism). Update: here's the latest on the subject via Bloomberg http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-12/deutsche-bank-to-buy-back-5-4-billion-bonds-in-euros-dollars

Back to the performance to-date, however.

Deutsche Bank's share price literally fell off the cliff at the start of this week, falling 10 percent on Monday and hitting its lowest level since 1984.

On bank’s performance side, concerns are justified. As I noted earlier, Deutsche posted a massive EUR6.89 billion loss for the year, with EUR2 billion of this booked in 4Q alone. Compared to 2014, Deutsche ended 2015 with its core equity Tier 1 capital (the main buffer against shocks) down from EUR60 billion to EUR52 billion.

Still, panic selling pushed DB equity valuation to EUR19 billion, in effect implying that some 2/3rds of the book of its assets are impaired. Which is nonsense. Things might be not too good, but they aren’t that bad today. The real worry with assets side of the DB is not so much current performance, but forward outlook. And here we have little visibility, precisely because of the utterly abnormal conditions the banks are operating in, courtesy of the global economy and central banks.

So markets are exaggerating the risks, for now. Psychologically, this is just a case of panic.

But panic today might be a precursor to the future. More of a longer term concern is DB’s exposure to the opaque world of derivatives that left markets analysts a bit worried (to put things mildly). Deutsche has taken on some pretty complex derivative plays in recent years in order to offset some of its losses relating to legal troubles. These instruments can be quite sensitive to falling interest rates. Smelling the rat, current leadership attempted to reduce bank’s risk loads from derivatives trade, but at of the end of 2015, the bank still has an estimated EUR1.4 trillion exposure to these instruments. Only about a third of the DB’s balance sheet is held in German mortgages and corporate loans (relatively safer assets), with another third composed of derivatives and ‘other’ exposures (where ‘other’ really signals ‘we don’t quite feel like telling you’ rather than ‘alternative assets classes’). For these, the bank has some EUR215 billion worth of ‘officially’ liquid assets - a cushion that might look solid, but has not been tested in a sell-off.


In summary: 

Deutsche’s immediate problems are manageable and the bank will most likely pull out of the current mess, bruised, but alive. But the two horsemen of a financial apocalypse that became visible in the Deutsche’s performance in recent weeks are worrying:
1) We have a serious problem with leverage remaining in the system, underlying dubious quality of assets and capital held and non-transparent balance sheets when it comes to derivatives exposures; and
2) We have a massive problem of residual, unresolved issues arising from incomplete response to markets abuses that took place before, during and after the crisis.

And there are plenty potential triggers ahead to derail the whole system. Which means that whilst Deutsche is not Europe’s Lehman, it might become Europe’s Bear Sterns, unless some other TBTF preempts its run for the title… And there is no shortage of candidates in waiting…



Links: 
DB’s 2015 report presentation deck: https://www.db.com/ir/en/download/Deutsche_Bank_4Q2015_results.pdf
DB’s internal memo to employees on how “ok” things are: https://www.db.com/newsroom_news/2016/ghp/a-message-from-john-cryan-to-deutsche-bank-employees-0902-en-11392.htm

Monday, July 27, 2015

27/7/15: IMF Euro Area Report: The Sick Land of Banking


The IMF today released its Article IV assessment of the Euro area, so as usual, I will be blogging on the issues raised in the latest report throughout the day. The first post looked at debt overhang.


So here, let's take a look at IMF analysis of the Non-Performing Loans on Euro area banks' balance sheets.

A handy chart to start with:



The above gives pretty good comparatives in terms of the NPLs on banks balance sheets across the euro area. Per IMF: "High NPLs are hindering lending and the recovery. By weakening bank profitability and tying up capital, NPLs constrain banks’ ability to lend and limit the effectiveness of monetary policy. In general, countries with high NPLs have shown the weakest recovery in credit."

Which is all known. But what's the solution? Ah, IMF is pretty coy on this: "A more centralized approach would facilitate NPL resolution. The SSM [Single Supervisory Mechanism - or centralised Euro area banking authorities] is now responsible for euro area-wide supervisory policy and could take the lead in a more aggressive, top-down strategy that aims to:

  • Accelerate NPL resolution. The SSM should strengthen incentives for write-offs or debt restructuring, and coordinate with NCAs to have banks set realistic provisioning and collateral values. Higher capital surcharges or time limits on long-held NPLs would help expedite disposal. For banks with high SME NPLs, the SSM could adopt a “triage” approach by setting targets for NPL resolution and introducing standardized criteria for identifying nonviable firms for quick liquidation and viable ones for restructuring. Banks would also benefit from enhancing their NPL resolution tools and expertise." So prepare for the national politicians and regulators walking away from any responsibility for the flood of bankruptcies to be unleashed in the poorly performing (high NPL) states, like Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia and Portugal.
  • And in order to clear the way for this national responsibility shifting to the anonymous, unaccountable central 'authority' of the SSM, the IMF recommends that EU states "Improve insolvency and foreclosure systems. Costly debt enforcement and foreclosure procedures complicate the disposal of impaired assets. To complement tougher supervision, insolvency reforms at the national level to accelerate court procedures and encourage out-of-court workouts would encourage market-led corporate restructuring."
  • There is another way to relieve national politicians from accountability when it comes to dealing with debt: "Jumpstart a market for distressed debt. The lack of a well-functioning market for distressed debt hinders asset disposal. Asset management companies (AMCs) at the national level could support a market for distressed debt by purchasing NPLs and disposing of them quickly. In some cases, a centralized AMC with some public sector involvement may be beneficial to provide economies of scale and facilitate debt restructuring. But such an AMC would need to comply with EU State aid rules (including, importantly, the requirement that AMCs purchase assets at market prices). In situations where markets are limited, a formula-based approach for transfer pricing should be used. European agencies, such as the EIB or EIF, could also provide support through structured finance, securitization, or equity involvement." In basic terms, this says that we should prioritise debt sales to agencies that have weaker regulatory and consumer protection oversight than banks. Good luck getting vultures to perform cuddly nursing of the borrowers into health.


Not surprisingly, given the nasty state of affairs in Irish banks, were NPLs to fall to their historical averages from current levels, there will be huge capital relief to the banking sector in Ireland, as chart below illustrates, albeit in Ireland's case, historical levels must be bettered (-5% on historical average) to deliver such relief:


Per IMF: "NPL disposal can free up large volumes of regulatory capital and generate significant capacity for new lending. For a large sample of euro area banks covering almost 90 percent of all institutions under direct ECB supervision, the amount of aggregate capital that would be released if NPLs were reduced to historical average levels (between three and four percent of gross loan books) is calculated. This amounts to between €13–€42 billion for a haircut range of between zero and 5 percent, and assuming that banks meet a target capital adequacy ratio of 13 percent. This in turn could unlock new lending of between €167–€522 billion (1.8–5.6 percent of sample countries’ GDP), provided there is corresponding demand for new loans. Due to the uneven distribution of capital and NPLs, capital relief varies significantly across euro area countries, with Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Ireland benefiting the most in this stylized example."

A disappointing feature, from Ireland's perspective, of the above figure is that simply driving down NPLs to historical levels will not be enough to deliver on capital relief in excess of the average (as shown by the red dot, as opposed to red line bands). The reason for this is, most likely, down to the quality of capital held and the impact of tax relief deferrals absorbed in line with NPLs (lowering NPLs via all but write downs = foregoing a share of tax relief).


Stay tuned for more analysis of the IMF Euro area report next.

Friday, May 1, 2015

Wednesday, April 22, 2015

22/4/15: Three Strikes of the New Financial Regulation – Part 5: European Banking Union


My latest post on Financial Regulations innovations courtesy of the European Union is now available on @learnsignal blog: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=175. This one starts coverage of the European Banking Union.

Monday, November 17, 2014

17/11/2014: All the years draining into banking cesspool...


So the tale of European banks deleveraging... record provisions, zero supply of credit for years, scores of devastated borrowers (corporate and personal), record subsidies, record drop in competition, rounds and rounds of 'stress testing' - all passed by virtually all, the Banking Union, the ESM break, forced writedowns in some countries, nationalisations, various LTROs, TLTROs, MROs, ABS, promises, threats, regulatory squeezes ... and the end game 6 years into the crisis?..


Per Bloomberg Brief, the sickest banking system on Planet Earth is... drum roll... Wester European one.

It is only made uglier by all the efforts wasted.

H/T for the chart to Jonathan. 

Monday, February 10, 2014

10/2/2014: Six Years to Admit the Obvious? Call in Europe...

There are two things to be said about the latest comments from Euro area's chief banking regulator, Danièle Nouy issued recently (see FT's piece from yesterday: "Let weak banks die, says eurozone super-regulator" for more):

  • They are so trivially obvious, that given it took EU 'leaders' 6 years to come up with them, one has to wonder if the EU mandarins have any capacity to supervise banks in the first place, and
  • Danièle Nouy deserves praise for speaking to the reality.

Here are the main points of what she said:

  1. “One of the biggest lessons of the current crisis is that there is no risk-free asset, so sovereigns are not risk-free assets. That has been demonstrated, so now we have to react.” Correct. But don't expect any change soon. 
  2. On the upcoming ECB tests: some banks need to fail for tests to be credible. 
  3. “We have to accept that some banks have no future,” she said, parrying speculation that a wave of consolidation could save the currency bloc’s weakest lenders. “We have to let some disappear in an orderly fashion, and not necessarily try to merge them with other institutions.”

You'd think all of the above should be trivial. And you would be right. Which makes the fact that these statements are front-page news in Europe ever so more amazing.

Thursday, January 2, 2014

2/1/2014: Economics of Christmas


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from December 29, 2013.


December is the month that economic forecasters learn to love and to hate.

They love the role the month plays in the annual aggregates for core economic time series. Get December trends right and you are free to bask in the warm glow of having an in-the-money forecast until the first quarter results start trickling into the newsflow.

They learn to hate a number of things that can make Christmas seasons notoriously volatile, especially around the time when economies switch paths from, say, recession to growth. Miss that moment and your forecasts will be out by a mile for a long time to come. Remember 2008-2009 when all analysts were racing against the tide of real data to update their projections downward? One of the reasons for this was that the peak of uncertainty fell on the last quarter. Secondly, Christmas behavior – by both consumers and businesses – is saddled with deep behavioural biases. This does not make holidays’ data fit well with mathematical models.

Ireland is a great case study for all of the above forces interacting with each other to underwrite our economic fortunes. Take the latest statistics, released last week, covering quarterly national accounts through Q3 2013. While this period does not include holidays shopping season, it is revealing of the strange currents in underlying data. Adjusted for inflation, personal consumption fell 1.22 percent in Q1-Q3 2013 and was down 1 percent in Q3 2013 relative to Q3 2012. In other words, household demand continues to underperform overall GDP and GNP in the economy.

This contrasts with continuous gains recorded in consumer confidence, which rose more than 21 percent year on year by the end of Q3 2013. In fact, the two series have been moving in the opposite direction since the mid-2009.

Some of the reasons for this paradoxical situation were revealed in the recent Christmas Spending Survey 2013, released by Deloitte. Despite the positive newsflow from the GDP and GNP aggregates, consumers in Ireland are more concerned with the state of domestic economy than their European counterparts. Overall, the percentage of Europeans who believe their purchasing power has diminished in 2013 compared to 2012 amounts to 41 percent. In Ireland, the figure is 48 percent. Only 26 percent of Irish consumers are expecting their disposable incomes to rise next year. In core spending cohorts comprising the 25-54 year olds, average proportion of population expecting improved incomes over the next year is even lower.

In other words, it seems to matter who asks the question in a survey and it matters what type of question is being asked. A question about confidence asked by an official surveyor yields one type of a reply. A question about actual tangible income expectations asked by a less formal private company surveyor yields a different outcome. These are two classic behavioural biases that wreck havoc with the data.

Despite the gloom, however, Ireland still leads Europe in terms of per capita spending during the Christmas season. Per Deloitte survey we plan to spend around EUR894 per household on gifts, entertainment and food in the last three weeks of December 2013, down from EUR966 reported in surveys a year ago and down from the actual spend of EUR909.

In brief, we are a nation of confident consumers with pessimistic outlook on the present and the future, who are spending less, but still outspend others when it comes to Christmas. A veritable hell of reality for our forecasters.


But what makes December a nightmarish month for those making a living predicting economic trends, makes it so much more exciting for research economists interested in explaining our choices and behaviour. For them, Christmas is when social mythology collides with reality.

Christmas purchases allow us to gauge the consumers’ ability to assess the value of things. In economics terms, the valuations involved are known as willingness to pay and willingness to accept. The former reflects the price we are willing to pay to obtain a pair of the proverbial woolen socks with a Christmas tree and Santa embroidered on them. The latter references the price we are willing to accept in order to give up the said pair of socks after they are passed to us by our kids with a ‘Merry Christmas, Dad!’ cheer.

In numerous studies, our willingness to accept is substantially higher than our willingness to pay – a phenomenon known as the endowment effect.

Christmas shopping data actually tells us that the endowment effect is present across various cultures. The data also tells us that the sentimental or subjective value attached to a gifted good is not a function of price. In other words, spending three times as much on Christmas festivities and gifts as the Dutch do, does not make Irish consumers any merrier.

But spending more has its costs. Some recent surveys indicate that up to one third of all Irish consumers will take on new debt during the Christmas season. In the Netherlands that figure is around one fifth. And long-term indebtedness is a costly proposition when it comes to social, psychological and financial wellbeing.

On the other hand, intangible quality of gifts matters to the consumers both in terms of giving and receiving. As the result, we tend to form expectations of what others value in gifts we give and we also match these expectation with our personal preferences. This induces series of biases and errors into our choices of gifts we purchase.

In Ireland, books represent top preference as a gift for both giving and receiving. In the majority of other countries in Europe, the matched preferences are for giving cash. Before we pat ourselves on the back for being a literature-loving nation, however, give this fact a thought. Giving cash provides a better matching between preferences of gift giver and gift recipient. In basic economics terms, cash gifts eliminate deadweight losses associated with gift giving. This, in turn, means that in countries where cash dominates physical goods giving, smaller expenditures on gifts achieve better outcomes in terms of recipients’ satisfaction. The reason for this is simple: we say we like something as a gift, but we still end up returning or recycling up to 30 percent (based on various studies) of gifts given to us. Why? Because goods are rearely homogeneous, so our preferences for books do not perfectly distinguish which books we like.

Gifts also have a reciprocal value. Christmas surveys have led us to a realization that the power of ‘give to receive’ thinking works well outside the holidays season as well. For example, charitable donations rise robustly when request for donations is accompanied by a forward gift from a charity. In one study, relative frequency of donations to a charity can rise by up to 75 percent when a gift is included with a request.

Still, research in economics overwhelmingly suggests that Christmas behavior by consumers delivers a significant deadweight loss to the economy and consumers-own wellbeing. In other words, our consumption patterns around Christmas can result in misallocation of resources that are not recoverable through the gains in retail sales, services, taxes and other economic activities. Given evidence from other countries, the deadweight loss from Christmas 2013 to the Irish economy can be anywhere in the region of EUR150-450 million.


Beyond economics of gift giving, popular mythology has it that Christmas is also a period of excess, especially when it comes to food and alcohol consumption. On average, this year, Irish consumers are expected to spend EUR259 on food per household. This is well ahead of the European average and reflects not only differences in prices, but also the level of alcohol consumption and our tendency to bundle food purchases with purchases of alcoholic beverages.

Culinary exploits of the festive season are generally subdued in quality and variety of food, but we make up for it with quantity. Marketing research suggests that the guiding principle to a successful Christmas meal is ‘safe, sound and abundant’ traditional dishes, rather than creative and experimental fare. Thus, virtually all cultures celebrating Christmas have a regulation-issued set of traditions designed to combat the festive season’s calories. These range from New Year resolutions (rarely followed through) to periods of fasting and abstinence (often tried, but rarely verified in terms of health virtues they claim to deliver).

One recent study looked at 54 million death certificates issued in the US from 1979 through 2004. The authors found that “there are holiday spikes for most major disease groups and for all demographic groups, except children. In the two weeks starting with Christmas, there is an excess of 42,325 deaths from natural causes above and beyond the normal winter increase.”

Another medical study found evidence of a significant weight gain in the US population during the December holidays. According to the study, the mean weight increased by 370 grams on average per person during the holidays. This weight gain remained intact during the rest of the year. In other words, all the New Year’s resolutions and health club memberships gifts cannot undo the damage done by turkey and gravy.


Last, but not least, popular mythology ascribes to the economists the definition given by Oscar Wild to a cynic: “A man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing”. But studies of the Christmas data show that for economists, the size of the gap between sentimental value of the gifts and their retail or market prices is lower than for other professions. It seems, the economists know both the price and the value of Christmas gifts better than other consumers. Sadly, that knowledge seems to be of little help when it comes to understanding what is going on with the Irish economy at large.




Box-out:

The latest instalment in the European banking union saga agreed two weeks ago was heralded by the EU leaders as the final assurance that the taxpayers will never again be forced to shore up European banks in a financial crisis. In reality, the final agreement on the structuring of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is a sad exemplification of the bureaucratic dysfunctionality that is Europe.

In the US, a single entity is responsible for assessing the viability of a bank experiencing an adverse shock and subsequently determining on the action to be taken in resolving the shock. That authority is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or FDIC.

In Europe, based on the latest agreement between the European Finance Ministers, the SRM will involve at least 148 senior officials across eight diverse decision-making bodies. The resolution procedures can involve up to nine, and at least seven different stages of approval. Majority of these stages require either simple or super-majority voting. The whole process is so convoluted, one doubts it can be relied upon to deliver a functional and timely response to any crisis that might impact Euro area banking in the future.

Is it time we renamed the European Banking Union a Byzantium Redux?

Thursday, December 26, 2013

26/12/2013: Don't Bank on the Banking Union: Sunday Times, December 15


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from December 15, 2013.


Over the last week, domestic news horizon was flooded by the warm sunshine of Ireland's exit from the Bailout. And, given the rest of the Euro area periphery performance to-date, the kindness of strangers was deserved.
Spain is also exiting a bailout, and the country is out of the recession, officially, like us. But it took a much smaller, banks-only, assistance package. And, being a ‘bad boy’ in the proverbial classroom, it talked back at the Troika and played some populist tunes of defiance. Portugal is out of the official recession, but the country is scheduled to exit its bailout only in mid-2014, having gone into it after Ireland. No glory for those coming second. Greece and Cyprus are at the bottom of the Depression canyon, with little change to their misery.

In short, Ireland deserves a pat on the back for not being the worst basket case of the already rotten lot. And for not rocking the boat. Irish Government talks tough at home, but it is largely clawless vis-à-vis the Troika. Our only moments of defiance in dealing with the bailout came whenever we were asked to implement reforms threatening powerful domestic interests, such as protected sectors and professions.

However, with all the celebratory speeches and toasts around, two matters are worth considering within the broader context of this week's events. The first one is the road travelled. The second is the road that awaits us ahead. Both will shape the risks we are likely to face in the medium-term future.


The road that led us to this week's events was an arduous one. Pressured by the twin and interconnected crises - the implosion of our banking sector and the collapse of our domestic economy - we fell into the bailout having burnt through tens of billions of State reserves and having exhausted our borrowing capacity. The crater left behind by the collapsing economy was deep: from 2008 through today, Irish GDP per capita shrunk 16.7 percent, making our recession second deepest in the euro area after Greece. This collapse would have been more benign were it not for the banking crisis. In the context of us exiting the bailout, the lesson to be learned is that the twin banking and growth crises require more resources than even a fiscally healthy state can afford. Today, unlike in 2008, we have no spare resources left to deal with the risk of the adverse twin growth and banking shocks.

Yet, forward outlook for Ireland suggests that such shocks are receding, but remain material.

Our economic recovery is still fragile and subject to adverse risks present domestically and abroad. On domestic side, growth in consumer demand and private investment is lacking. Deleveraging of households and businesses is still ongoing. Constrained credit supply is yet to be addressed. This process can take years, as the banks face shallower demand for loans from lower risk borrowers and sharply higher demand for loans from risky businesses. On top of this, banks are deleveraging their own balance sheets. In general, Irish companies are more dependent on banks credit than their euro area competitors. Absent credit growth, there will be no sustained growth in this economy. Meanwhile, structural reforms are years away from yielding tangible benefits. This is primarily due to the fact that we are yet to adopt such reforms, having spent the last five years in continued avoidance of the problems in the state-controlled and protected domestic sectors.

On the Government side, Budgets 2015 and 2016 will likely require additional, new revenue and cost containment measures. Post 2016, we will face the dilemma of compensating for the unwinding of the Haddington Road Agreement on wages inflation moderation in the public sector and hiring freezes.
To-date, Irish economy was kept afloat by the externally trading services exporters, or put in more simple terms - web-based multinationals. Manufacturing exports are now shrinking, although much of this shrinkage is driven by one sector: pharmaceuticals.

Meanwhile, the banking sector is still carrying big risks. Heavy problems of non-performing loans on legacy mortgages side, unsecured household credit and non-financial corporates are not about to disappear overnight. Even if banks comply with the Central Bank targets on mortgages arrears resolution, it will take at least 18-24 months for the full extent of losses to become visible. Working these losses off the balance sheets will take even longer.
Overall, even modest growth rates, set out in the budget and Troika projections for 2014-2018, cannot be taken for granted.


This week, the ongoing saga of the emerging European Banking Union made the twin risks to banks and growth ever-more important. The ECOFIN meetings are tasked with shaping the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, or BRRD. These made it clear that Europe is heading for a banking crisis resolution system based on a well-defined sequencing of measures. First, national resources will be used in the case of any banks' failures, including in systemic crises. These resources include: wiping out equity holders, and imposing partial losses on lenders and depositors. Thereafter, national funds can be used to cover the capital shortfalls and liquidity shortages. Only after these resources are exhausted will the EU funds kick in to cover the residual capital shortfalls. This insurance cover will not be in the form of debt-free cash. Instead, the funding is likely to involve lending to the Government and to the banks under a State guarantee.

When you run through the benchmark levels of capital shocks that could qualify a banking system for the euro-wide resolution funding under the BRRD, it becomes pretty clear that the mechanism is toothless. For example, in the case of our own crisis, haircuts on bondholders under the proposed rules could have saved us around EUR15-17 billion. In exchange, these savings would have required bailing in depositors with funds in excess of the state guarantee. It is unlikely that we could have secured any joint EU funding outside the Troika deal. Our debt levels would have been lower, but not because of the help from Europe.

This last point was made very clear to us by this week’s events. After all, our historically unprecedented crisis has now been 'successfully resolved' according to the EFSF statement, and as confirmed by the European and Irish officials. The 2008-2010 meltdown of the Irish financial system was dealt with without the need for the Banking Union or its Single Resolution Mechanism.

With a Banking Union or without, given the current state of the Exchequer balance sheet, the buck in the next crisis or in the next iteration of the current crisis will have to stop at the depositors bail-ins. In other words, banking union rhetoric aside, the only hope any banking system in Europe has at avoiding the fate of Cyprus is that the next crisis will not happen.


Second issue relates to the continued reliance across the euro area banks on government bonds as core asset underpinning the financial system. In brief, during the crisis, euro area banks have accumulated huge exposures to sovereign bonds. This allowed the Governments to dramatically reduce the cost of borrowing: the ECB pushed up bonds prices with lower interest rates and unlimited lending against these bonds as risk-free collateral.

The problem is that, unless the ECB is willing to run these liquidity supply schemes permanently, the free lunch is going to end one day. When this happens, the interest rates will rise. Two things will happen in response: value of the bonds will fall and yields on Government debt will rise. The banks will face declines in their assets values, while simultaneously struggling to replace cheap ECB funding with more expensive market funds.

Given that European Governments must roll over significant amounts of bonds over the next 10 years, these risks can pressure Government interest costs. Simple arithmetic says that a country with 122 percent debt/GDP ratio (call it Ireland) and debt financing cost of 4.1 percent per annum spends around 5 percent of its GDP every year on interest bills, inclusive of rolling over costs. If yield rises by a third, the cost of interest rises to closer to 6.6 percent of GDP. Now, suppose that the Government in this economy collects taxes and other receipts amounting to around 40 percent of GDP. This means that just to cover the increase in its interest bill without raising taxes or cutting spending, the Government will need nominal GDP growth of 3.9 percent per annum. That is the exact rate projected by the IMF for Ireland for 2014-2018. Should we fail to deliver on it, our debts will rise. Should interest rates rise by more than one-third from the current crisis-period lows, our debts will rise.


The point is that the dilemmas of our dysfunctional monetary policy and insufficient banking crisis resolution systems are not academic. Instead they are real. And so are the risks we face at the economy level and in the banking sector. Currently, European financial systems have been redrawn to contain financial exposures within national borders. The key signs of this are diverged bond yields across Europe, and wide interest rates differentials for loans to the real economy. In more simple terms, courtesy of dysfunctional policymaking during the crisis, Irish SMEs today pay higher interest rates on loans compared to, say, German SMEs of similar quality.

Banking Union should be a solution to this problem – re-launching credit flowing across the borders once again. It will not deliver on this as long as there are no fully-funded, secure and transparent plans for debt mutualisation across the European banking sector.



Box-out:

Recent data from the EU Commission shows that in 2011-2012, European institutions enacted 3,861 new business-related laws. Meanwhile, according to the World Bank, average cost of starting a business in Europe runs at EUR 2,285, against EUR 158 in Canada and EUR 664 in the US. Not surprisingly, under the burden of growing regulations and high costs, European rates of entrepreneurship, as measured by the proportion of start up firms in total number of registered companies, is falling year on year. This trend is present in the crisis-hit economies of the periphery and in the likes of Austria, Germany and Finland, who weathered the economic recession relatively well. The density of start-ups is rising in Australia, Canada, the US and across Asia-Pacific and Latin America. In 2014 rankings by the World Bank, the highest ranked euro area country, Finland, occupies 12th place in the world in terms of ease of doing business. Second highest ranked euro area economy is Ireland (15th). This completes the list of advanced euro area economies ranked in top 20 worldwide. Start ups and smaller enterprises play a pivotal role in creating jobs and developing skills base within a modern economy. The EU can do more good in combatting unemployment by addressing the problem of regulatory and cost burdens we impose on entrepreneurs and businesses than by pumping out more subsidies for jobs creation and training schemes.

Tuesday, December 3, 2013

Saturday, November 9, 2013

9/11/2013: Stress testing zombie banks: Sunday Times, November 3


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from November 3, 2013.


In the marble and mahogany halls of European high finance HQs, the next few months will be filled with the suspense of the preparation for the banks audits.

Much of this excitement will be focused on matters distant to the real economy. Truth is, saddled with zombie banks, and public and private sectors’ debt overhangs, euro area is incapable of generating the growth momentum sufficient to wrestle itself free from the structural crisis it faced since 2008. The latest ECB forecasts for the Euro area economy, released this week, predicted real GDP contraction of 0.4 percent for 2013 and growth of 1 percent in 2014. With these numbers, the end game is the same today as it was two years ago, when previous stress tests were carried out. The system can only be repaired when banks absorb huge losses on unsustainable loans.

New stress tests are unlikely change this. However, the tests are important within the context of the weaker banking systems, such as the Irish one. The reason for this is that the ECB needs to contain the sector risks as it goes about building the European Banking Union, or EBU.

The good news is – there are low- and high-cost options for achieving this containment in Ireland’s case. The bad news is – neither involves any relief on the legacy banks debts necessary to aid our stalled economy. The worse news is – the Government appears to be pushing for exiting the bailout without securing the low cost option, leaving us exposed to the risk of being saddled with the costlier one.


The IMF data suggests that Euro area-wide banks’ losses can be as high as EUR350-400 billion - or just under one third of the total deleveraging that still has to take place in the banks. The ECB needs to have an accurate picture of how much of the above can arise in the countries where banks and Government finances are already strained beyond their ability to cover such losses. The ECB also needs to deliver such estimates without raising public alarms as to the levels of losses still forthcoming.

Taken together, the above two points strongly suggest that in the case of Ireland, the banks will come out of the stress tests with a relatively clean bill of health shaded somewhat by risk-related warnings. Pointing to the latter, the ECB will implicitly or explicitly ask the Irish Government to secure funding sources for dealing with any realization of such risks. Such precautionary funding can only come from either a stand-by credit line with the IMF and/or European stabilization funds, or a commitment to set aside some of the NTMA cash. An NTMA set-aside will cost us the price of issuing new Government debt. This is potentially more than ten times the price of IMF credit line.

In short, Ireland should be using ECB’s concerns over our banking system health to secure a cheaper precautionary line of credit. Judging by this week’s comments from the Government, we are not. One way or the other, it is hard to see how continued uncertainty build up within Irish banks can help our cause in obtaining both a precautionary line of credit and a relief on legacy banks debts.


The ECB concerns about Irish banks are not purely academic. Our banking crisis is far from over.

Consider the latest data on three Pillar Banks: AIB, Bank of Ireland and Permanent tsb, covering the period through H1 2013 courtesy of the IMF and the EU Commission reviews published over recent weeks. On the surface, the three banks are relatively well capitalised with Core Tier 1 capital ratio of 14.1 percent, down on 16.3 percent a year ago. Meanwhile, the deleveraging of the system is proceeding at a reasonable pace, with total average assets declining EUR30.5 billion year on year.

The problem is that little of this deleveraging is down to writedowns of bad loans. This means that high levels of capital on banks balance sheets are primarily due to the extend-and-pretend approach to dealing with nonperforming loans adopted by the banks to-date. All members of the Troika have repeatedly pointed out that Irish banks continue to avoid putting forward long-term sustainable solutions to mortgages arrears and that this approach can eventually lead to amplification of risks over time.

Loans loss provisions are up 11 percent to EUR28.2 billion and non-performing loans are up to EUR56.8 billion. Still, while in H1 2012 non-performing loans accounted for 22.2 percent of all loans held by the banks, at the end of June this year, the figure was 26.6 percent. Non-performing loans are now 35.5 percent in excess of banks’ equity, up from just 4.7 percent a year ago. As a reminder, Irish Exchequer holds 99.8 percent stake in AIB, 99.2 percent share in Ptsb and 15.1 percent stake in Bank of Ireland. This means that should capital buffers fall to regulatory-set limits, further writedowns of loans will mean nullifying the Exchequer stakes in the banks and crystalising full losses carried by the taxpayers.

Continued weaknesses in the solvency positions of the banks are driven primarily by three factors. Firstly, as banks sell or collateralise their better loans their future returns on assets are diminished. The second factor is poor operational performance of the banks. Net losses in the system fell between H1 2012 and H1 2013. However, this still leaves banks reliant on capital drawdowns to fund their non-performing assets. The third factor is the weak performance of banks’ non-core financial assets. Over the last 12 months, Irish banks holdings of securities grew in value at a rate that was about 12-15 times slower than the growth rate in valuations of assets in the international financial markets.

In short, the IMF review presented the picture of the banking sector here that retains all the signs of remaining comatose. This was further confirmed by the EU Commission report this week, and spells trouble for the Irish banks stress tests.

In 2011 recapitalisation of Irish banks, the Central Bank assumed that banks operating profits will total EUR3.9 billion over the 2011-2013. So far the banks are some EUR4.5 billion shy of matching the Central Bank’s rosy projection.

This shortfall comes despite dramatic hikes in interest margins on existent and new loans, decreases in deposit rates, and reductions in operating costs. Compared to H1 2011 when the PCARs were completed, lending rates margins over the ECB base rate have shot up by up to 138 basis points for households and 59 basis points for non-financial companies. Rates paid out on termed deposit have fallen some 103 basis points. As the result, banks net interest margins rose.

On top of that, the funding side of the banks remains problematic. The NTMA is now holding almost half of its cash in the Pillar Banks, superficially boosting their deposits. Private sector deposits continue to trend flat and are declining in some categories. This is before the adverse impacts of Budget 2014 measures, including the Banks levy and higher DIRT rates start to bite.

Behind these balance sheet considerations, the economy and the Government are continuing to put strains on households' ability to repay their loans. This week, AA published analysis of the cost of mortgages carry (the annual cost of financing average family home and associated expenses). According to the report, the direct cost of maintaining an average Irish home purchased prior to the crisis is now running at around EUR 21,940 per annum. Under Budget 2014 provisions, a married couple with two children and combined income of EUR 100,000 will spend one third of their after-tax earnings on funding an average house. In such a setting, any major financial shock, such as birth of another child, loss of employment, extended illness etc., can send the average Celtic Tiger household into arrears.


All of this, means that any honest capital adequacy assessment of the Irish banking system will be an exercise in measuring a litany of risks and uncertainties that define our banks’ operating conditions today and into the foreseeable future. Disclosing such weaknesses in the system will risk exposing Irish banks to renewed markets pressures, including possible failures to roll over maturing debts coming due. It can also impair their ability to continue deleveraging, and fund assets writedowns. On the other hand, leaving these stresses undisclosed risks delaying recognition of losses and exposing us to pressure from the ECB down the line.

Not surprisingly, as the ECB goes into stress tests exercise, it is exerting pressure on Ireland to arrange a stand-alone precautionary line of credit. While it is being presented as a prudential exercise in light of our exit from the bailout, in reality the credit will be there to cushion against any potential losses in the banking system over 2014-2018, before the actual EBU comes into force. Should such losses materialise, the Exchequer will be faced with an unpalatable choice: hit depositors with a bail-in or pony up some more cash for the banks. Having a stand by loans facility arranged prior to exiting the Bailout will help avoid the latter and possibly the former. The cost, however, will be an increase in overall interest charges paid by the State, plus continued strict oversight of our fiscal position by the Troika.

A rock of interest charges and Troika supervision, a hard place of zombiefied banking, and a rising tide of risks are still beckoning Ireland from the other side of the stress tests.




Box-out: 

The latest data from the retail sector released by the CSO this week painted a rather mixed picture of the domestic economy’s fortunes. Controlling for some volatility in the monthly series, Q3 2013 data shows that despite very favourable weather conditions over the July-September 2013, Irish core retail sales (excluding motors sales) fell in volume by some 0.3 percent compared to Q3 2012. On the other hand, there was a 0.6 percent increase in the value of sales over the same period. Currently, the volume of total core retail sales in Ireland sits 4.3 percent below 2005 levels. Non-food sales, excluding motor trades, fuel and bars sales, fell 2.1 percent on 2012 in volume and is up 1.2 percent in value. The inflation effects imply that when it comes to core non-food sales, the volumes of retail trade are now down 22 percent on 2005 levels, while the value of sales is up almost 2 percent. Consumers are still on strike, while retailers are getting only a slight prices relief in the unrelenting crisis.

Friday, July 12, 2013

12/7/2013: Few links on European Federalism

Recently, I wrote about the emergence of federalist movement in Europe and the requirement for federalisation to proceed along the direction and depth consistent with looser, more locally-based and flexible path of Swiss Federalism. The original post is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/1962013-european-federalism-and-emu.html

In a Project Syndicate article, Hans Helmut Kotz makes a very similar point, including the strong positioning of weaker federalist model as risk management driver for future policies:
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/germany-s-economic-groupthink-by-hans-helmut-kotz

Couple quotes (italics are mine):

"... if the eurozone is to be a sensible long-term proposition, mere survival is not enough. The main justification for a monetary union cannot be the possibly disastrous consequences of its falling apart. Even less convincing is the neo-mercantilist point that the eurozone would allow for indefinite current-account surpluses (it does not)."

"Originally, Europe’s monetary union was supposed to provide a stable framework for its deeply integrated economies to enhance living standards sustainably. It still can. But this requires acknowledging what the crisis has revealed: the eurozone’s institutional flaws. Remedying them calls for a minimum of federalism and commensurate democratic legitimacy – and thus for greater openness to institutional adaptation."


Update: Swiss Confederate system is once again coming up as a model for the EU Federalissation here: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/06/20/the-eu-should-take-inspiration-from-switzerland-in-its-attempts-to-increase-democratic-legitimacy/

Friday, June 21, 2013

21/6/2013: Europe's Capacity Deficit Illustrated

Want an example of Europe's 'capacity deficit' I mention here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/1962013-european-federalism-and-emu.html

Look no further than the latest set of quotes fired off by ECFIN E-news letter:


Let's take them through reading.

Mr Rehn says that 'Banking Union is not about bailing banks'. Of course he is right - the EU has bailed out the banks before it conceived the EBU. However, one major objective of the EBU is about systematising future bailouts of the banks, in theory - to restrict taxpayers' expected liabilities in such bailouts, and to regulate future depositors' liabilities. And EBU is - according to the EU Commission and the ECB - a necessary element of the sovereign-banks 'break' that includes ESM. Now, ESM is about bailing out the banks.

Is EBU 'about getting a banking system that serves the real economy'? Well, nothing in the EBU proposals so far has much to do with the 'real economy' in a positive sense of serving it. At least nothing that requires an EBU and cannot be done absent EBU. Deposits insurance? Doesn't need an EBU. Joint supervision and regulation? Hardly much to do with the real economy, unless one is to make a claim that the two are fail-proof way of ensuring that a new crisis won't happen. In fact, when it comes to the real economy, the EBU is a part of the policy instruments package that includes depositors  bail-ins, mechanism for sovereign liabilities imposition and fiscal harmonisation - these are about the real economy, but there is little in terms of 'support' here. More like 'limiting damage' by 'spreading the cost'. Reality check: UK has an EBU equivalent, US and Japan have one... all had banking crises that cost their real economies dearly...

So Mr Rehn is just plain propagandising, right? Well, sort of - the EBU is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the survival of the Euro. If you accept the thesis that Euro's survival is the 'service' that real economy needs, then you have 1/2 of Rehn's equation there.

Onto Mr Lamy who says that Europeans need something new to drive their attention away from the bad things that are old. Contemplating the past is disuniting the peoples of Europe. Giving them something new to desire (may be a promise of a new iPad for everyone would work?) will shift them to work toward the future, presumably forgetting and forgiving the past and the present. How did the Soviet leaders not think this one up? 'We promise you this better future because we screwed up your past and present' school of politics...

Ireland's Taoiseach is honestly thinking that EBU is necessary to give credibility to European leaders because they promised EBU. Neither the concept of 'do we need A in the first place', nor the irony of his party pre-election promises not being delivered on strike Mr Kenny as being a touch testing. And then there's 'following through on decisions is the very least our citizens expect and demand'. Not really. Citizens demand that political leaders (a) adopt right decisions, then (b) implement right decisions. Having not established that EBU is right fails both (a) and (b).

But the most priceless bit of Mr Kenny's statement is that he believes that something is crucial because it is a credibility test. Mr Kenny's logic here is risking a resemblance to a schoolboy's logic who, in fear of hearing 'Chicken! Chicken!' from a schoolyard bullies heads off to carrying out a silly and dangerous deed, lest his 'credibility' be challenged.

This, per the EU's powerful, is 'leadership' at the time of a crisis?..

Wednesday, June 19, 2013

19/6/2013: European Federalism and EMU Experience



There is a number of flaws in the euro area design that were exposed by the current crisis. Perhaps the most fundamental is the flaw relating to the system complete incapacity to generate critical capacity. Despite the crisis continuing for the 7th year in a row, the EU and the euro area as its core sub-set remains unable to ask the key question of viability of the social, political and economic project based on the premise that ever-increasing levels of policies and institutions integration, harmonisation and coordination is a feasible and a desired direction to pursue.

Let's start from the top.

Firstly, it is now pretty much an accepted wisdom that in shaping the EMU, European leaders have failed to see even the basic implications of deep integration. The implications missed were not just monetary or economic. Current crisis has shown deep divisions within the euro area on matters such as inflationary preferences, expectations formation mechanisms, conditionality evaluations and fiscal transfers, all cutting across social and cultural division lines, rather than purely economic ones. This failure has led to the design flaws that are principles-based and, as such, cannot be corrected by managerialist solutions. They require structural change - a matter of concern for Europe, so far incapable of following through with even managerialist changes, such as adherence to well-specified Maastricht Criteria targets at the times of aplenty or expression of any solidarity at the times of constraints. There is little hope the EU can deliver on much less defined, broader and, at the same time, culturally and socially more challenging reforms and changes required to move the euro project forward, away from the danger zone.

Secondly, it is also pretty clear that the EU institutions are incapable of learning from the mistakes of their leaders and from the signals transmitted from the nation states and the electorates. Instead of making an effort to understand the underlying causes for a rushed, poorly planned and poorly executed monetary policy harmonisation, the EU leaders are now jumping head-in into attempting to cure the sever hangover from the common currency creation by doing more of the same - embracing the idea of banking and financial services integration (the Banking Union - EBU) and political consolidation (the Political Union - EPU).

A combination of the two directions will, under these conditions, risk leading Europe toward a repeat of the EMU fiasco on a much grander scale - a failure of all three 'unions' - the EMU, the EBU and the EPU. History can repeat itself, having shown its hand today as a structural crisis in one area of the system, with a replay of the crisis across the entire system.

There are number of reasons for this conjecture.

The EU's latest drives - across political and banking dimensions - into deeper integration are lacking the deep foundations on both, the demand and supply sides of their respective equations. In this, they are  exactly mirroring the EMU creation that too faced the original minor crisis in the 1990s only to be pushed through in the noughties.

In case of the EPU, the lack of these foundations is even more fundamental than in the case of EMU or EBU. EPU has no political legitimacy and is losing any potential future legitimacy on a daily basis. EU institutions and even the core ideas of the later-stages EU (EMU, Fiscal Compact, 6+2 Pack packages of legislation etc) are deep under water when it comes to popular mandates. All Eurobarometer surveys show rising dissatisfaction across the EU with the European institutions, including the common currency. The two words 'democratic deficit' that were present in the European politics prior to the crisis are now, probabilistically-speaking, dominate the popular and national discourse about Europe in every country of the Union, including the new Accession states. A popular mandate in Iceland has led to cancellation of the EU Accession talks this month.

Only doctrinaire Europhiles, and even then, predominantly within smaller countries' national elites, as exemplified by some members of Ireland's ruling coalition, today deny the presence of this deficit at the fundamental level across all European institutions.

There is also a major problem of Europe's 'capability deficit'. Brussels - full of (mostly) men in suits with offices to go to after lunch is hardly a source for inspiration or for leadership. And absent inspiration, perspiration does not work all too well. The entire European project lacks vitality, and thus - viability. There is no enthusiasm, no ideal, no dream. These were exhausted at the stages in the project history when 'peace between France and Germany' had meaningful referential counter-point (it no longer has, as no one sane enough would conjecture that absent the EU, Alsace will be once again dug into an anti-tank trenches giant washing board) or when the EU (brilliantly and correctly) was expanding the liberty of trade and freedom of movement across its internal borders. Absent purpose, leadership is wanting too. The void is filled with simulacra of bureaucrateese: the alphabet soup of 'programmes' such as ESM, EFSF, EFS, OMT, EBU, and so on, all the way until ordinary European gets lost in the world of corridors, meeting rooms, windowless conference venues, meaningless letters and mumbo-jumbo of various white papers, etc.

To confront these deficits, the EU is creating even more bureacrateese - papers, positions, plenaries, meetings, councils, pacts, compacts, conferences, agendas.

Amidst this, Europe still lacks a single face capable of holding its own in front of the electorate. Lacks, that is, on the 'federalist' or pro-EU side. There are rhetorically competent MEPs on the opposition side of the chamber, but there is not a single appointed or elected leader of the 'official' Europe capable of not putting to sleep at least half of his/her audience.

Europe has 4 'Presidents' today: President [of the Commission] Mr Jose Manuel Barroso, President [of the Council] Herman von Rompuy, President [of the Parliament] Martin Shulz, President [of the Eurogroup] Jeroen Dijsselbloem. Absent the latter one, not a single one have been known for talking straight on any hard issues. Including the latter one, none inspire many to anything akin the commitments and sacrifices required to achieve meaningful federalisation of the EU. All, with no exception, got their EU positions bypassing direct election by the voters of Europe. Power and responsibilities of each are directly proportional to the distance by which they are removed from the European electorate. When these levels of confusion and power politics dispersion are not enough, there's always a fifth President lurking around: the Head of the Presidency State. In Henry Kissinger's terminology, the question is not 'Who do you call when you want to speak to Europe?' can now be replaced by 'Who do you not call?' Latest G8 summit photos stood as a great exemplification of the problem: there amidst leaders of 8 nations stood three 'leaders' of Europe, not because they had anything to say, but because they had to be there to upstage one another.

The five-headed 'leadership' beast is now on a quest to 'increase democratic mandate' of the EU Commission. To do so, it is proposed that the blocks of parties shall be formed in the EU Parliament to 'nominate' the next Commission and its President. In other words, the EU leadership sees 'renewal' and 'democratic participation' as a function of optics. Dominant blocks of largely sclerotic national-level parties will be dominating the EU legislature and executive to simply replicate the stasis that has captured national political platforms of the main EU states: Germany, France, Italy and Spain. Effective opposition will remain impossible, just as it remains today, but the fig leaf of 'more direct' ('slightly less-managed') democracy will act to cover this up from, hopefully, oblivious or satisfied electorates.

Thus, by design from above (not by will from below), the EU is supposed to move toward a two-party system, replicative of the traditional core parties of the national politics: the centre-left with a clientilist base in unions, state employees and 'social pillars' - the 'social democratic centre'; and the centre-right with a clientilist base of 'employers confederations' and state managers - the 'populist & conservative movements'.

The dynamism of such a system will be equivalent to the excitement of a turtles race on sticky putty. Or differently, a two-party system will do for the political leadership what the Euro did for the monetary policy - put a straightjacket of superficial conformity onto the society that for centuries was based on differentiation-driven boundaries and nation states.

Both demographic and socio-economic changes from the 1945 through today, in Europe as elsewhere, have meant emergence of more diversity and differentiation in markets for everything, starting with simple products, such as diapers to complex services, such as healthcare. To assume that politics and ideologies can remain in the stasis of the two, adjoining at the centre and even overlapping, sets of ideals and policies is about as naive and counterproductive as it was to assume that Greece and Finland, or Latvia and Portugal, can be brought into single currency within a span of one/two decades.

There are three key ingredients that are required to sustain two-party system: 1) stability of ideological preferences (informed by popular objectives for policy), 2) allegiance to the single unifying institution of the state overriding local/national/ethnic or even more atomistic allegiances and interests, and 3) organic evolution of the two-party system (usually out of the bifurcating economic power balance, such as land-owners vs capital owners, workers vs capital owners etc).

Modern world, especially the world of Europe, does not support either one of these preconditions. Current conflicts and, thus, incentives lines are drawn across generations; skills groups; risk-taking capabilities and preferences of populations; national and even sub-national distinctions; ethnic, historical and cultural differences and grievances; external threats that range across a very wide spectrum from immigration from the South to hegemonic threat from the East, to cultural threat from the West, and so on. Two ideologies can never capture this diversity, let alone provide a sufficient basis for forming participatory democratic institutions. Look no further than internal nation states' dynamics in the UK (Scotland, Norther Ireland, Wales), Italy (North, South, East), Spain (Centre, North-East, North-West), Belgium, and recall the fate of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia. Look at the emergence of challengers to the two-party systems in all European states - never quite capable of displacing one of the parties of the 'old' system, but always present, reflective of the ongoing process of atomisation, or rather customisation of politics.

At the same time, with hundreds of millions spent on propagandising the concept of European citizenship, Europeans remain in deep allegiance to their nation-states, and in many Federal states - to their local 'tribes'. In fact, the EU has been recognising this and reinforcing the locally-anchored distinctions. Culturally, everyday life matters more to the majority of Europeans today that the 'geopolitical' aspirations of Brussels. And culturally, we are living in an increasingly 'goo-cal' world, where trade delivers to us goods and services from all over the world, but we identify ourselves on the basis of goods and services that are local in origin.

In the countries, where two-party system seemingly is stable - e.g. the US and the UK - underneath the surface, the fact that the two-party system fails to capture sufficient percentage of population in an ever-increasingly individualised world is also evident. It is expressed in the stalemate produced by the system where mainstream parties are captive to small minorities of activists and are often torn internally by sub-groups and sub-interests.

Lastly, the two-party system of ideological debate has been shown inadequate in the face of the current crisis.

Looking forward, this failure is extremely significant. In order to work, compared to today's EU, the EPU must be either comprehensive or devolved. On the latter, see below. The former requires significant transfer of power and power base to the EU, implying ca 20% of GDP-sized Federal Government, dominant power of taxation, harmonisation of core public services, such as health, social security, pensions, education. The member states will be allowed some 'gold-plating' of the Federally-set standards, but the standards will have to be set nonetheless. The reason for this is that in a real Federal Union, there will be a functional Transfer Union and that implies standardisation of services funded by transfers. A two-party system will never be able to break away from the sub-national political bases sufficiently enough to deliver such homogenisation.


If European federalism is to evolve, it will have to evolve on the basis of accommodating more diversity, not by homogenising the system by reducing differentiation and fragmentation of the political institutions. It will have to adopt market-like features where turnover of ideas is fast, deployment of solutions (goods and services) is rapid and never permanent, and the system thrives on diversity. This is the exact opposite of the harmonisation and consolidation implicit in traditional federalism, but is rather more consistent with Swiss federalism. The key to this form of federalism is that it severely limits the central powers of taxation and redistribution of resources and vests powers of policy origination, design and implementation in local hands. It also acts to encourage policy heterogeneity - an added bonus in the world of uncertainty, as it allows for creation of policy hedges: a shock impacting different systems differently necessarily shows both the pitfalls and the strengths of various institutions and regulations. In other words, Europe needs less of European centralisation and more of European diversity.

Before this can be delivered, however, Europe needs to systemically dismantle or reduce those institutions that act as an impediment to bottom-up governance - the institutions of centralisation of power.

The first for a review should be the strictest of them all - the euro. Here, the required change will see assisted exits from the euro of non-core states, leaving behind only those countries for which monetary harmonisation makes sense. Most likely these are Germany, Finland, Czech, Austria, and possibly Belgium and the Netherlands. Other countries can revert to their own currencies and/or run open currency system with euro remaining one of the legal tenders in their economies. Belgium and Luxembourg can run in a union with France, if so desired.

The second candidate for restructuring will be the EU Commission. The President of the Commission should be elected on the basis of direct vote with state-based 'electoral' voting system similar to that of the US, to alleviate extremes of population-weighted distribution of votes. The President then can appoint her/his own Commission on the basis of: (1) each member state must be represented in the Commission, (2) Commission candidates can be nominated by member states, the EU Parliament and the President, (3) each member is confirmed independently by the EU Parliament and the Senate.

The third candidate for reform is the EU legislature. The European Parliament should be augmented by the independent, separately elected Senate, based on member states' representation principle and vested with the powers similar to that of the US Senate. The Senate should be directly elected and it should replace the current Council. To strengthen direct links between nation states and the Senate, the formal leaders of the nation states (e.g Italian and Irish presidents) should serve as senators representing their states.

The fourth candidate for reform should be the system of European checks and balances. This should, among others, include a Constitutional ceiling on taxation and redistribution powers.


There are other reforms that will be required. This is hardly a place to attempt to narrate them all. However, the key principle is that the EU needs a drastic reconstruction of its upper levels of legislative and executive powers. And the key question that is yet to be asked and debated (a necessary pre-condition to deriving any solutions) is whether the proposed EPU (and to a less important extent, the proposed EBU) stand a chance of working out any better than the failing EMU?