Showing posts with label skills. Show all posts
Showing posts with label skills. Show all posts

Friday, November 13, 2020

13/11/20: The economy has two chronic illnesses (and neither are Covid)

My column for The Currency this week covers two key long-term themes in the global economy that pre-date the pandemic and will remain in place well into 2025: the twin secular stagnations hypotheses and the changing nature of the productivity. The link to the article is here; https://thecurrency.news/articles/28224/the-economy-has-two-chronic-illnesses-and-neither-are-covid/


 

Wednesday, May 6, 2020

6/5/20: H1B Visas and Local Wages: Undercutting Human Capital Returns


The Economic Policy Institute published an interesting piece of research on the links between H1B visas and lower wages paid by the U.S. employers for key skills: https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/. As far as I can see, the report does not cover academic faculty employment, but it does cover data from universities and other non-profits.


The report is worth reading.

Tuesday, September 11, 2018

11/9/18: Slow Recoveries & Unemployment Traps: Hysteresis and/or Secular Stagnation


The twin secular stagnations hypothesis (TSSH, first postulated on this blog) that combines supply-side (technological cyclicality) and demand-side (demographic cyclicality) arguments for why the world economy may have settled on a lower growth trajectory than the one prevailing before 2007 has been a recurrent feature of a number of my posts on this blog, and has entered several of my policy and academic research papers. Throughout my usual discourse on the subject, I have persistently argued that the TSSH accommodates the view that the Global Financial Crisis and the associated Great Recession and the Euro Area Sovereign Crisis of 2007-2014 have significantly accelerated the onset of the TSSH. In other words, TSSH is not a displacement of the arguments that attribute current economic dynamics (slow productivity growth, slower growth in the real economy, reallocation of returns from labour and human capital to technological capital and, more significantly, the financial capital) to the aftermath of the structural crises we experienced in the recent past. The two sets of arguments are, in my view, somewhat complementary.

From this later point of view, a research paper, "Slow Recoveries & Unemployment Traps: Monetary Policy in a Time of Hysteresis" by Sushant Acharya, Julien Bengui, Keshav Dogra, and Shu Lin Wee (August 2018 https://sushantacharya.github.io/sushantacharya.github.io/pdfs/hysteresis.pdf) offers an interesting read.

The paper starts with the - relatively common in the literature - superficial (in my opinion) dichotomy between the secular stagnation hypothesis and the "alternative explanation" of the slowdown in the economy, namely "that large, temporary downturns can themselves permanently damage an economy’s productive capacity." The latter is the so-called 'hysteresis hypothesis', "according to which changes in current aggregate demand can have a significant effect on future aggregate supply" which dates back to the 1980s. The superficiality of this dichotomy relates to the causal chains involved, and to the impact of the two hypotheses.

However, as the authors note, correctly: "While the two sets of explanations may be observationally similar, they have very different normative implications. If exogenous structural factors drive slow growth, countercyclical policy may be unable to resist or reverse this trend. In contrast, if temporary downturns themselves lead to persistently or permanently slower growth, then countercyclical policy, by limiting the severity of downturns, may have a role to play to avert such adverse developments."

The authors develop a model in which countercyclical monetary policy can "moderate" the impact of the sudden, but temporary large downturns, i.e. in the presence of hysteresis. How does this work?

The authors first describe the source of the deep adverse shock capable of shifting the economy toward long-term lower growth rates: "in our model, hysteresis can arise because workers lose human capital whilst unemployed and unskilled workers are costly to retrain". This is not new and goes back to the 1990s work on hysteresis. The problem is explaining why exactly such deep depreciation takes place. Long unemployment spells do reduce human capital stock for workers, but long unemployment spells are feature of less skilled workforce, so there is less human capital to depreciate there in the first place. Retraining low skilled workers is not more expensive than retraining higher skilled workers. In fact, low skilled workers seek low skilled jobs and these require only basic training. It is quite possible that low skilled workers losing their jobs today are of certain demographic (e.g. older workers) that reduces the effectiveness of retraining programs, but that is the TSSH domain, not the hysteresis domain.

One thing that does help this paper's hypothesis is the historical trend of growing duration of unemployment, e.g. discussed here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2017/07/27717-us-labor-markets-are-not-in-rude.html and the associated trend of low labour force participation rates, e.g. discussed here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/06/8618-human-capital-twin-secular.html. I do agree that unskilled workers are costly to retrain, especially in the presence of demographic constraints (which are consistent with the secular stagnation on the demand side).

But, back to the authors: "... large adverse fundamental shocks can cause recessions whose legacy is persistent or permanent unemployment... Accommodative policy early in a recession can prevent hysteresis from taking root and enable swift a recovery. In contrast, delayed monetary policy interventions may be powerless to bring the economy back to full employment."

"As in Pissarides (1992), these features [of long unemployment-induced loss of human capital, sticky wages that prevent wages from falling significantly during the downturns, costly search for new jobs, and costly retraining of workers] generate multiple steady states. One steady state is a high pressure economy: job finding rates are high, unemployment is low and job-seekers are highly skilled. While tight labor markets - by improving workers’ outside options - cause wages to be high, firms still find job creation attractive, as higher wages are offset by low average training costs when job-seekers are mostly highly skilled." Note: the same holds when highly skilled workers labour productivity rises to outpace sticky wages, so one needs to also account for the reasons why labour productivity slacks or does not keep up with wages growth during the downturn, especially when the downturn results in selective layoffs of workers who are less productive ahead of those more productive. Hysteresis hypothesis alone is not enough to do that. We need fundamental reasons for structural changes in labour productivity that go beyond simple depreciation of human capital (or, put differently, we need something similar to the TSSH).

"The economy, however, can also be trapped in a low pressure steady state. In this steady state, job finding rates are low, unemployment is high, and many job-seekers are unskilled as long unemployment spells have eroded their human capital. Slack labor markets lower the outside options of workers and drive wages down, but hiring is still limited as firms find it costly to retrain these workers." Once again, I am not entirely convinced we are facing higher costs of retraining low skilled workers (as argued above), and I am not entirely convinced we are seeing the problem arising amongst the low skilled workers to begin with. Post-2008 recovery has been associated with more jobs creation in lower skilled categories of jobs, e.g. hospitality sector, restaurants, bars, other basic services. These are low skilled jobs which require minimal training. And, yet, we are seeing continued trend toward lower labour force participation rates. Something is missing in the argument that hysteresis is triggered by cost of retraining workers.

Back to the paper: "Importantly, the transition to an unemployment trap following a large severe shock can be avoided. If monetary policy commits to temporarily higher inflation after the liquidity trap has ended, it can mitigate both the initial rise in unemployment, and its persistent (or permanent)
negative consequences. Monetary policy, however, is only effective if it is implemented early in the downturn, before the recession has left substantial scars... [otherwise] ...fiscal policy, in the form of hiring or training subsidies, is necessary to engineer a swift recovery."

The paper tests the model in the empirical setting. And the results seem to be plausible: "allowing for a realistic degree of skill depreciation and training costs... is sufficient to generate multiple steady states.... this multiplicity is essential in explaining why the unemployment rate in the U.S. took 7 years to return to its pre-crisis level. In contrast, the standard search model without skill depreciation and/or training costs predicts that the U.S. economy should have fully recovered by 2011. ...the model indicates that had monetary policy been less accommodative or timely during the crisis, leading to a peak unemployment rate higher than 11 percent, the economy might have been permanently scarred and stuck in an unemployment trap. Furthermore, our model suggests that the persistently high proportion of long-term unemployed in the European periphery countries may reflect a lack of timely monetary accommodation by the European Central Bank."

Fraction of Long-term unemployed (>27 weeks) in select countries. 
The figure plots five quarter moving averages of quarterly data. 
The dashed-line indicates the timing of Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech. 


Source: Eurostat and FRED.

This seems quite plausible, even though it does not explain why eventual 'retraining' of low skilled workers is still not triggering substantial increases in labour productivity growth rates in Europe and the U.S.

One interesting extension presented in the paper is that of segmented labour markets, or the markets where "employers might be able to discern whether a worker requires training or not based on observable characteristics - in particular, their duration of unemployment... [so that, if] skilled and unskilled workers searched in separate markets, the economy would still be characterized by hysteresis, but it would take a different form. There are two possibilities to consider. [If] ... the firm’s share of the surplus from hiring an unskilled worker, net of training costs, is large enough to compensate firms for posting vacancies in the unskilled labor market, ...after a temporary recession which increases the fraction of unskilled job-seekers, it can take a long time for these workers to be reabsorbed into employment. Firms prefer to post vacancies in the market for skilled job-seekers rather than the market for unskilled job-seekers in order to avoid paying a training cost. With fewer vacancies posted for them, unskilled job-seekers face a lower job-finding rate and thus, the outflow from the pool of unskilled job-seekers is low. In contrast, the skilled unemployment rate recovers rapidly - in fact, faster than in the baseline model with a single labor market... [Alternatively], the segmented labor markets economy could experience permanent stagnation, rather than a slow recovery, [if] unskilled workers are unemployable, since firms are unwilling to pay the cost of hiring and training these workers. Thus unskilled workers effectively drop out of the labor force."

We do observe some of the elements of both such regimes in the advanced economies today, with simultaneous increasing jobs creation drift toward lower-skilled, slack in supply of skills as younger, educated workers are forced to compete for lower skilled jobs, and a dropout rate acceleration for labour force participation. Which suggests that demographics (the TSSH component, not hysteresis component) is at play at least in part in the equation.


In summary, a very interesting paper that, in my opinion, adds to the TSSH arguments a new dimensions: deterioration in skills due to severity of a demand shock and productivity shock. It does not, however, contradict the TSSH and does not invalidate the key arguments of the TSSH. As per effectiveness of monetary or monetary-fiscal policies in combatting the long-term nature of the adverse economic equilibrium, the book remains open in my opinion, even under the hysteresis hypothesis: if hysteresis is accompanied by a permanent loss of skills twinned with a loss of productivity (e.g. due to technological progress), adverse demographics (older age cohorts of workers losing their jobs) will not be resolved by a training push. You simply cannot attain a catch up for the displaced workers using training schemes in the presence of younger generation of workers competing for the scarce jobs in a hysteresis environment.

And the Zero-Lower Bound on monetary policy still matters: the duration of the hysteresis shock will undoubtedly create large scale mismatch between the sovereign capacity to fund future liabilities (deficits) and the longer-run inflationary dynamics implied by the extremely aggressive and prolonged monetary intervention. In other words, large enough hysteresis shock will require Japanification of the economy, and as we have seen in the case of Japan, such a scenario does not lead to the economy escaping the TSSH or hysteresis (or both) trap even after two decades of aggressive monetary and fiscal stimuli.

Friday, April 21, 2017

21/4/17: Any evidence that immigrants are undermining welfare of the natives?


Given current debates surrounding the impact of migrant labour on native (and previously arriving migrants) wages, jobs security, career prospects and other major motivations behind a wide range of migration regimes reforms proposed across a number of countries, including the U.S., it is worth revisiting research done by Giovanni Peri of University of California, Davis, USA, and IZA, Germany back in 2014.

Titled “Do immigrant workers depress the wages of native workers?” and published by IZA World of Labor 2014: 42 in May 2014, https://wol.iza.org/articles/do-immigrant-workers-depress-the-wages-of-native-workers/long, the paper reviews 27 original studies published between 1982 and 2013, covering the topic of immigration impact on wages of the natives. Chart below summarises:


In the above, the “values report the effects of a 1 percentage point increase in the share of immigrants in a labor market (whether a city, state, country, or a skill group within one of these areas) on the average wage of native workers in the same market.

For example, an estimated effect of 0.1 means that a 1 percentage point increase in immigrants in a labor market raises the average wage paid to native workers in that labor market by 0.1 percentage point. These studies used a variety of reduced-form estimation and structural estimation methods; all the estimates were converted into the elasticity described here.”

Here’s the summary of Peri’s findings and conclusions:



Friday, June 10, 2016

10/6/16: Italian Manufacturing Capacity post-crisis


A third paper on manufacturing capacity, also from Italy is by Libero Monteforte and Giordano Zevi, titled “An Inquiry into Manufacturing Capacity in Italy after the Double-Dip Recession” (January 21, 2016, Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 302: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2759786).

Here, the authors “…investigate the effects of the prolonged double-dip recession on the productive capacity of the Italian manufacturing sector”. The authors “…estimate that between 2007 and 2013 capacity contracted by 11–17%, depending on the method.”

In addition, the authors “…conduct an exercise to quantify the loss with respect to a counterfactual evolution of capacity in a ‘no-crisis’ scenario in which pre-2008 trends are extrapolated: in this case the loss is close to 20% for all methods.”

Summary of the results:


And here is decomposition of the potential output drop by factor of production:



Per authors: “In terms of factor determinants, about 60% of the cumulated drop of potential output in 2007-13 came from labour, while around 25% was attributable to the TFP (Chart above). The reason why the contribution of capital is comparatively small is twofold: first, the industrial
sector is characterized by a large wage share (close to 70%), therefore the contribution of K in the production function is limited; second, capital is a highly persistent variable and the fall in investments recorded during the two recessions, even if remarkably large, has not (so far)
resulted in a dramatic drop of the capital stock.”

The key lessons from all of this are: potential output in Italy fell precipitously across the manufacturing economy in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Meanwhile, counterfactual extension of pre-crisis trends was strongly signalling to the upside in manufacturing.

Majority of metrics used suggest that productive capacity in Italy declined by 15-18 percent through 2013, while counterfactual estimates for pre-crisis trend would have implied an average rise of ca 5 percent.

Last, but not least, “Firms producing basic metals, fabricated metal products and machinery and equipment are found to be the ones that were most penalized by the crisis of the last six years; by contrast, sectors that were already shrinking before 2008, such as the manufacture of textiles, appear not to have performed significantly worse during the double-dip recessions than they had in the early 2000s.”

10/6/16: Italian Industrial Production: 2007-2013


Staying with the earlier theme of industrial / manufacturing sector trends, here is a paper from the Banca d’Italia, authored by Andrea Locatelli, Libero Monteforte, and Giordano Zevi, titled “Heterogeneous Fall in Productive Capacity in Italian Industry During the 2008-13 Double-Dip Recession” (January 21, 2016, Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 303: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2759788) looks at the two periods of shocks, separated by one period of brief recovery.

Per authors, “between 2008 and 2013 productive capacity was considerably downsized in the Italian manufacturing sector” based on micro data from the Bank of Italy surveys across “the whole 2008-13 period and in four sub-periods (pre-crisis 2001-07, first phase of the crisis 2008-09, recovery 2010-11, and second crisis 2012-13).”



The study main findings are:
i) “losses of productive capacity varied widely across manufacturing sub-sectors with differences in pre-crisis trends tending to persist in a few sub-sectors during the double-dip recession”;
ii) “large firms were more successful in avoiding major capacity losses, especially in the first phase of the crisis”;
iii) “the share of sales on foreign markets was negatively correlated with performance in 2008-09, but the correlation turned positive in 2012-13”;
iv) “among the Italian macro-regions, the Centre weathered the long recession better” (see charts below);
v) “subsidiaries underperformed firms not belonging to any group”; and
vi) “the negative effects on productive capacity of credit constraints, which discouraged investments, were felt by Italian firms particularly in 2012-13”.

Very interesting outrun by region, presented here in two charts:




Some beef on that point: “The decline in [productive capacity] was not evenly distributed across the Italian macro-regions. The macro-regions more exposed to foreign demand were severely hit by the global financial crisis, with [productive capacity] declining by 8.6% in the North West and 7.0% in the North East.” Now, here’s the irony: Italy was (barely) able to sustain long-term Government borrowing on foot of its extremely strong exporters. During the recent twin crises, this very strength of the Italian economy turned against it. Which sort of raises few eyebrows: strong exporting capacity of Italy led the country to experience sharper shock than in many other states. Yet, the core prescription for growth from across the EU members states is - export!; and core prescription for recovery from the status quo main stream economists is - beef up current ace t surpluses (aka, raise exports relative to imports). Italian evidence does not really sound that supportive of these two ‘solutions’…

“During the temporary recovery, the South under-performed the rest of the country, losing 4.0% of its [productive capacity], while [productive capacity] stagnated in the other macro-regions.”

“The sovereign debt crisis affected the entire country more evenly. As a result, between 2010 and 2013 the loss of [productive capacity] in the South (-8.0%) was roughly twice as large as that recorded in the rest of the country (-4.7%)… The gap reflects the within-country heterogeneity in firms’ characteristics : …South Italy has mainly small firms, with an average of 100 employees (roughly constant during the double-dip crisis). Average firm size is larger in the Centre, just below 150, and in the North East, around 180, and even more so in the North West (consistently above 200). …southern regions have smaller export shares (about 20%), which are higher everywhere else (around 35% at the beginning of the sample); the export share shows a positive trend in all macro-regions.” You can see these reflected in the charts above.

In summary, thus, “the degree of foreign exposure helps to explain why the North suffered more during the global financial crisis. Also, the continuing decline of [productive capacity] in the South since 2007 is consistent with the smaller firm size in that macro-area (discussed above) and the larger decline of domestic demand there”.


So the key lesson here is: in the current environment characterised by rising regionalisation of trade flows and weak global demand, the exports-led recovery is more likely to trigger a negative shock to the economy than support economic growth.

Unless you are talking about a country like Ireland, where exports are booming despite global demand slowdown. Which, of course, cannot be explained by anything other than beggar-thy-neighbour tax optimisation policies.

10/6/16: Wither Manufacturing? Evidence from Denmark


Couple of posts relating to most current research on the recovery and longer term prospects in global manufacturing. As usual here, we shall focus on the advanced economies.

A recent NBER paper, by Andrew Bernard, Valerie Smeets, and Frederic Warzynski, titled “Rethinking Deindustrialization” (March 2016, NBER Working Paper No. w22114: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2755386) looked at decline in manufacturing activity in Denmark, showing that “manufacturing employment and the number of firms have been shrinking as a share of the total and in absolute levels.” The authors examine this phenomena over the period of 1994 to 2007.

“While most of the decline can be attributed to firm exit and reduced employment at surviving manufacturers, we document that a non-negligible portion is due to firms switching industries, from manufacturing to services.”

Here is an interesting list of related findings based on looking closer at the “last group of firms before, during, and after their sector switch”:

  • “Overall this is a group of small, highly productive, import intensive firms that grow rapidly in terms of value-added and sales after they switch.”
  • “By 2007, employment at these former manufacturers equals 8.7 percent of manufacturing employment, accounting for half the decline in manufacturing employment.”
  • “…we identify two types of switchers: one group resembles traditional wholesalers and another group that retains and expands their R&D and technical capabilities.”

Net result? Quite surprising conclusion that the “findings emphasize that the focus on employment at manufacturing firms overstates the loss in manufacturing-related capabilities that are actually retained in many firms that switch industries.”


Thursday, October 22, 2015

22/10/15: Gig Economy and Human Capital: Evidence from Entrepreneurship and Self-Employment


In a couple of weeks, I will be speaking about the role of human capital in the emergence of the new economy at the CXC Corporate event “Globalization & The Future of Work Summit” in Dublin.

Without preempting what I am going to say, here are some key points of interest.

Human capital-centric growth is overlapping, but distinct from the so-called “Gig Economy”, primarily because of the different definition of what constitutes two respective workforces.

Take, for example, the U.S. data. Based on research by the American Action Forum by Rinehart and Gitis (2015) we can define three types of the broadly-speaking “Gig Economy” workers: “For our most narrow measurement of gig workers (labeled Gig 1) we simply include independent contractors, consultants, and freelancers. Our middle measurement (Gig 2) includes all Gig 1 workers plus temp agency workers and on-call workers. Our broadest measurement (Gig 3) includes all Gig 2 workers plus contract company workers.”

The respective numbers engaged in three categories in 2014 range between 20.5 million and 29.7 million with growth rates over the recent years outpacing economy-wide jobs expansion rates across all categories of the Gig Economy workers.

Still, the key problem with identifying underlying trends in the development of the Gig Economy is the lack of data on specifics of occupational choices of the self-employed individuals and the relationship between these choices and human capital held by the Gig Economy participants relative to the traditional employees.

To see the indicators of links between the Gig Economy and human capital, we have to look at the more established literature concerning transition to entrepreneurship.

One interesting set of studies here comes from the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a large biannual household survey conducted by the Banca d’Italia. A 2007 paper by Federici, Ferrante and Vistocco looked at the links between institutional structures, technological innovation and human capital in determining the propensity to transition from employment to entrepreneurship. Looking at the general literature on the subject, the authors state that “…institutions are more important than technology (i.e., technological specialization and/or industry composition) in fostering or restricting entrepreneurship and that the interactions between institutions and occupational choices may be complex and non linear”. The authors caution against directly linking self-employment rates with entrepreneurship rates, as “countries displaying the same self-employment rates, might be endowed with very different amounts and qualities of entrepreneurial skills devoted to innovation and business ventures (or, on the other hand, they might not)”.

To better pinpoint the link between entrepreneurship, self-employment and the institutional and technological drivers for risk taking, Federici, Ferrante and Vistocco augment the survey data with a set of variables describing the social and institutional environment in which self-employed and traditional workers are operating. Crucially, “in addition to standard indexes of economic and social infrastructure at the local level, [the authors] include a measure of creativity developed by Florida (2004).”

The conclusions are strong: “in Italy, both institutional and technological factors have shaped entrepreneurial opportunities requiring, tacit knowledge embedded in social networks and in the cultural background of families… Hence, well-educated people lacking privileged access to tacit knowledge and, in particular, an appropriate family background, could find themselves up against a considerable barrier to entrepreneurship and occupational mobility.” In simple terms, the Gig Economy-related value added can and should be considered within the context of family and cultural institutions as much as technological enablement environment.

As per traditional metrics of human capital, the study conclusions appear to be contradicting the core literature on entrepreneurship. “The evidence of the highly significant negative role of education in entrepreneurial selection is very strong in comparison with the majority of international studies showing that education has either a positive impact (Blanchflower, 1998) or a statistically non-significant effect on occupational choices”. In other words, formal education seems to be more conducive to employment choices in traditional environments (e.g. full time jobs),w it exception, perhaps, of professional skills-based activities.

The negative links between education and propensity to engage in entrepreneurial activity is, however, in line with other Italian study based on the same data, authored by Sabatini (2006).

However, U.S. data-based studies frequently find existence of a U-shaped relationship between income and propensity to transition to self-employment, with highest propensities concentrated around low income earners and high income earners, while lower propensities occurring for middle income earners. One recent example of this evidence is Moutray (2007). In so far as formal education is an instrument for income, especially for sub-populations excluding very high income earners, this suggests that the negative relationship between self-employment and education found in the case of Italy can be culturally conditioned and does not translate to other economies.

Another interesting aspect of transition to the ‘Gig Economy’ relating to the links between human capital and creativity or cultural institutions was uncovered by a 2011 paper by Mitra and Abubakar who looked at data from the Local Authority Districts of Thames Gateway South Essex (TGSE) in East of England. The study attempted “to explore and identify key determinants of business formation in Knowledge Intensive sectors (which include the creative industries) of regions outside the major metropolitan conurbations, and their possible differences with other Non-Intensive Sectors.”

The authors found that human capital is “positively correlated with new business entry in Knowledge intensive sectors”, but at the same time, it is “negatively correlated with new startups in non-knowledge intensive sectors”. Per authors: “This finding suggests that while entrepreneurship in knowledge based and creative industries requires highly skilled labour, in non knowledge based industries, low skilled labour is the primary determinant of new firm creation. Our findings also appear to suggest the need for higher skills/educated base in order to boost the growth of new businesses” in high knowledge-intensity sectors.

Werner and Moog (2009) use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to map out significant linkages between entrepreneurial learning (and entrepreneurial human capital) and the probability of transition from traditional employment to self-employment. One interesting aspect of their findings is that learning-by-doing occurring (in their sample) during tenure of working for an SME has positive impact on ability to transition to entrepreneurship, confirming similar findings from other European countries. This also confirms findings that show that working for SMEs results in more frequent exits into self-employment and that such exits more frequently result in transition to full entrepreneurship than for self-employment entered from employment in larger firms.

The learning-by-doing effect of pre-transition experience for starting entrepreneurs and self-employed is also confirmed by the UK study by Panos, Pouliakas and Zangelidis (2011) who looked at the self-employment transition dynamics for individuals with dual job-holding and the links between this transition and human capital and occupational choice between primary and secondary jobs. The study used a wide (1991-2005) sample of UK employees from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The authors investigated, sequentially, “first, the determinants of multiple job-holding, second, the factors affecting the occupational choice of a secondary job, third, the relationship between multiple-job holding and job mobility and, lastly, the spillover effects of multiple job-holding on occupational mobility between primary jobs.” The findings indicate that “dual job-holding may facilitate job transition, as it may act as a stepping-stone towards new primary jobs, particularly self-employment.” An interesting aspect of the study is that whilst the major effects are present in the lower skilled distribution of occupations, there is also a significant and positive effect of dual-jobs holding on transition to self-employment for professional (highly skilled) grade of workers.

Finally, there is a very interesting demographic dimension to transition to self-employment, explored to some extent in the U.S. data by Zhang (2008). The paper focused on the topic of elderly entrepreneurship. The author conjectures that in modern (ageing) demographic setting, “the “knowledge economy” could elevate the value of elderly human capital as the “knowledge economy” is less physically demanding and more human-capital- and knowledge-based.” Zhang (2008) largely finds that professional, skills-based self-employment and entrepreneurship amongst the older generations of workers can act as an important force in reducing adverse impact of ageing on modern economies.


The common thread connecting the above studies and indeed the rest of the vast literature on entrepreneurship, self-employment and transition from traditional employment to more projects-based or client-focused forms of engagement in the labour markets is increasingly shifting toward the first type of the ‘Gig Economy’ engagement. This typology of the ‘Gig Economy’ is becoming more human capital and skills-intensive and is better aligned with the ‘knowledge economy’ and the ‘creative economy’ than ever before. In simple terms, therefore, the ‘Gig Economy’ not only reaches deeper than the traditional view of the shared services (Uber et al) growth trends suggest.

While both increasing in importance and broadening the set of opportunities for economic development, the modern ‘Gig Economy’ is presenting significant challenges to social, cultural and policy norms that require swift addressing. These challenges are broadly linked to the need to Create, Attract, Retain and Enable key human capital necessary to sustain long term development and growth of the ‘Gig Economy’.

With that, tune in to my talk at the CXC Corporate event “Globalization & The Future of Work Summit” (link: http://cxccorporateservices.com/cxc-future-of-work/) in few weeks time for the details as to what should be done to put global ‘Gig Economy’ onto the sustainable development and growth track.


Sources:

Will Rinehart, Ben Gitis, “Independent Contractors and the Emerging Gig Economy” July 29, 2015,

Federici, Daniela and Ferrante, Francesco and Vistocco, Domenico, "On the Sources of Entrepreneurial Talent in Italy: Tacit vs. Codified Knowledge" (July 24, 2007)

Sabatini, Fabio, "Educational Qualification, Work Status and Entrepreneurship in Italy: An Exploratory Analysis" (June 2006). FEEM Working Paper No. 87.2006

Velamuri, S. Ramakrishna and Venkataraman, S., "An Empirical Study of the Transition from Paid Work to Self-Employment". Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance and Business Ventures, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 1-16, August 2005

Moutray, Chad M., "Educational Attainment and Other Characteristics of the Self-Employed: An Examination Using Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics" (December 11, 2007). Hudson Institute Research Paper No. 07-06.

Mitra, Jay and Abubakar, Yazid, "Entrepreneurial Growth and Labour Market Dynamics: Spatial Factors in the Consideration of Relevant Skills and Firm Growth in the Creative, Knowledge-Based Industries" (August 23, 2011). University of Essex CER Working Paper No. 1.

Werner, Arndt and Moog, Petra M., "Why Do Employees Leave Their Jobs for Self-Employment? – The Impact of Entrepreneurial Working Conditions in Small Firms" (November 1, 2009).

Panos, Georgios A. and Pouliakas, Konstantinos and Zangelidis, Alexandros, "Multiple Job Holding as a Strategy for Skills Diversification and Labour Market Mobility" (August 23, 2011). University of Essex CER Working Paper No. 4.

Zhang, Ting, "Elderly Entrepreneurship in an Aging U.S. Economy: It's Never Too Late" (September 8, 2008). Series on Economic Development and Growth, Vol. 2.

Thursday, April 23, 2015

23/4/15: Skills and Employment: 1950-2010 Data


A very interesting study, titled "Labor Market Polarization Over the Business Cycle" by
Christopher L. Foote and Richard W. Ryan (http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp/wp2014/wp1416.pdf) from the Boston Fed postulates that "Job losses during the Great Recession were concentrated among middle-skill workers, the same group that over the long run has suffered the most from automation and international trade." This is what is known as occupational polarisation - the disappearance of mid-range skills and low-end skills jobs and growth in higher skilled occupations.

The study finds "that middle-skill occupations have traditionally been more cyclical than
other occupations, in part because of the volatile industries that tend to employ middle-skill workers. Unemployed middle-skill workers also appear to have few attractive or feasible employment alternatives outside of their skill class, and the drop in male participation rates during the past several decades can be explained in part by an erosion of middle-skill job opportunities."

One hell of a chart illustrating the above across longer time horizon:

Shares of Employment for Four Occupational Groups:


Saturday, May 17, 2014

15/5/2014: Innovation, Employment & Growth: Ireland's Human Capital Dilemma


This is an unedited version of my article for Sunday Times, April 06.


From jobs programmes aiming to boost employment creation to entrepreneurship strategies and to solemn promises to unlock credit supply and investment for indigenous innovation-based enterprises, Irish SMEs have been basked in the public policy sunshine.

Much of this attention is cross-linked to another public policy fad, Ireland’s long-running obsession with innovation and R&D. In 2013, amidst continued borrowing for day-to-day operations from the Troika, Irish State spent EUR773 million on supporting research and development activities in academia and industry. Of this, a good portion was targeted to fund R&D and other innovation activities linked to Irish indigenous SMEs.

There are three basic problems with all this policies activism. One, we have no idea as to what sort of financial returns this public investment generates to the taxpayers. Two, we have virtually no coherent and independently verified evidence that the innovation-focused SMEs are delivering any serious economic returns in terms of real jobs creation and income generation. Three, we have no proof the state-funded innovation is a right model for SMEs growth generation in the first place.


Enterprise innovation is a weak spot for Ireland. Indigenous patent applications reported in July last year by the Patents Office and covering full year 2012 stand at decades low. Monthly data from the New Morning IP – an Irish consultancy dealing with issues of intellectual property – shows that in 2013 indigenous patents applications fell even further, down by almost 3 percent year on year.

Back in 2006, the national strategy for science set 2013 as the target date to deliver a 'world class knowledge economy'. Since then, numbers of indigenous patents filed under the Cooperation Treaty and to the European Patent Office have declined.

And the problem reaches beyond our SMEs. For example, per IDA own figures, only 28 percent of agency clients have spent more than EUR100,000 per annum on R&D. In other words, nearly three out of four MNCs had, de facto, nil research activity here.

The university sector is the cornerstone of Irish Government's vision for delivering an innovation-focused SMEs culture. Sadly, our best universities are barely visible on the radar of international rankings. Ireland’s top university currently ranks only 61st in the QS Top University league table and 129th in the Times Higher Education (THE) rankings. Trinity ranks 55th in Arts & Humanities – an area that receives absolutely zero attention from the likes of IDA and Enterprise Ireland and is firmly placed outside our economic development policy umbrella. TCD ranks 81st in engineering and technology, 83rd in life sciences and medicine and 136th in natural sciences. All of these areas are focal points for R&D spending and feed into state enterprise supports systems. UCD is no better: ranked 139th in the world under QS criteria and 161st by the THE rankings.

By pretty much every possible metric, our innovation engines are not firing.


Meanwhile, enterprise formation, an area that should be a core priority for the Government that is allegedly focusing on entrepreneurship and jobs creation, is lagging. Irish start-ups rates, relative to the economy size, are low today and have been low even in the days prior to the Great Recession.

Based on the OECD statistics, despite years of booming ICT services and substantial growth in the IFSC, Ireland today shows relatively static number of enterprises trading in market services, and declines in the number of enterprises working in manufacturing and industries, excluding the construction sector.

Late last year, OECD published its Economic Survey of Ireland. The document recommended empirically founded approach to enterprise and innovation supports. OECD noted that over-proliferation of funding agencies and programmes is yet to be scaled back. Per OECD, Ireland has over 170 "separate budget lines… and 11 major funding agencies involved in disbursing the Science Budget". Meanwhile, the Government continues to add new ones, seemingly with little regard for their effectiveness. Not surprisingly, there is no evidence on systematic and independent evaluation of these programmes effectiveness. And there are no continuously reported return metrics relating to state investments in enterprise development and innovation.

Instead of real statistics, often misleading and highly aggregate numbers are being put forward as markers of success. Jobs commitments and gross jobs additions are presented as signifiers of major breakthroughs, without independent audits. Companies’ registrations rates are reported as being equivalent to start up rates and no central data reporting is provided for actual enterprise formation. Take for example a jump reported in new companies registrations in Q1 2014 when 10,741 new companies were entered into the register, marking a 6% rise year on year. This number included 3,989 limited companies - the third highest rate of new limited companies registrations for the first quarter over the last 10 years.

Sadly, these headline statistics tell us preciously little about the underlying dynamics of companies formation. For example, how many business restructurings completed in 2012-2013 are now leading to companies re-registrations? How many of the businesses launched in previous years survive? How many of businesses launched are actively trading in the real economy? We simply do not know.

Focus on top-line reporting metrics, such as aggregate numbers of companies registered, VC funds disbursed, R&D budgets spent, obscures the woeful lack of coherent policies supporting indigenous enterprises formation and growth. As the result, beyond the areas of ICT services, biotech and medical devices, we neither foster formation of micro enterprises nor help smaller companies to reach 'medium' size. And, via tax and compliance measures, we actively penalize self-employment – the source of much of the early-stage entrepreneurship.


Promoting real innovation and enterprise cultures requires supporting investment ecosystem and entrepreneurial risk-taking. These goals can only be achieved by lower taxation, especially via lower CGT and income tax, and a benign and highly efficient personal and business insolvency regime. These are not priority areas for the Government.

However, tax policies mix is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for success. To further promote real enterprise growth, we need to stop fetishising scientific R&D-driven enterprises and ICT and refocus public funding toward more evidence-based enterprise development projects.

International research shows that ordinary and traditional sectors SMEs drive growth in jobs and income. Where traditional sectors are put onto exporting paths, these SMEs can drive exports growth as well. In contrast, high performance start-ups in ICT services, usually focused directly on exports markets, are less employment and income-intensive. ICT does contribute strongly to productivity growth and is a nice niche business to have on offer for investors, but as McKinsey recent research pointed out, tech innovation business is unlikely to fulfill the economy-wide hunger for jobs, especially jobs for the indigenous workforce.

Focusing on active training for entrepreneurship and mentoring of new companies is another necessary addition to the policies mix that is currently being sidelined in favour of populist drive for state investment and R&D funding. One key area where we are lacking in supports is access for entrepreneurs to legal, tax and financial advice. Costs of tax and legal compliance and structuring are unbearably high for younger companies and for smaller enterprises considering growth strategies. These costs crowd out funding available to companies to finance further development, hiring, as well as cap companies growth potential.

On investment side, we have a thriving culture of VCs chasing the 'next Facebook'. Over 90 percent of all VC funding extended in Ireland goes to finance ICT start-ups, with more than two-thirds of this going to ICT services companies, as opposed to physical technologies.  We also have over 75 incubators and accelerators, with the vast majority of these being state-owned and/or state-funded. These too focus almost exclusively on companies working in ICT, biotech and other lab-linked innovation sectors.

But we have no idea as to the effectiveness of this strategy. Numbers employed in core ‘knowledge economy’ sectors have grown by about 4,900 from the onset of the crisis through 2013. All of this growth was down solely to ICT jobs which added 9,125 new employees, while professional, scientific, and technical activities employment, excluding education sector, is down 4,225 on 2008. Adding up jobs creation reported by the MNCs from 2008 through present, it is highly likely that indigenous employment in professional, scientific, technical, and information and communication sectors has probably shrunk.

Looking at the overall landscape of enterprise formation here, we do know that with exception of Ryanair, CRH, Paddy Power and a handful of other flagship companies, no Irish SME has grown beyond the 'medium' level threshold. The magic target of exceeding EUR20 million in annual sales - set in the Enterprise Ireland 2005-2007 strategy plan has vanished, unmet.

Put simply, Irish indigenous companies are not getting smarter with billions of public funds invested in SMEs-targeting R&D activities and ventures over the years. At the same time, Irish SMEs are not growing in size either. Micro enterprises show some progression toward becoming small firms, but small firms show little dynamism upward and medium-sized companies are stuck with no capacity to break into the big firms league. The system is broken and incremental policy adjustments are not holding a promise of a solution. We need to go back to the drawing table on enterprise policy in Ireland.



Box-out: 

Recent research from the US, published by the National Bureau for Economic Research looked into sell-side equity analysts' ability to predict equity prices and the impact their predictions have on market valuations over the period of 1983-2011. Controlling for a wide variety of factors that routinely influence forecast errors, the study has found that at the times of the crises sell-side analysts forecasting accuracy deteriorates by up to 50 percent relative to normal. And just as analysts’ errors explode, their influence rises as well. In particular, forecasts that upgrade outlook for companies amidst the falling market tend to carry the greatest weight of public attention. Optimism pays, even if only for analysts’ employers. Which, of course, creates a powerful incentive for sell-siders to ‘talk up’ equities just around the time of the worst bear market. Lastly, the study found that at the time of financial crises, marketing efforts by sell-side analysts tend to increase, in part due to greater pressure on them to perform, in part due to expanded opportunities for being ‘heard’ by investors.

John Kenneth Galbraith thought that "The conventional view serves to protect us from the painful job of thinking." In the case of sell-side analysts musings on the crises, that might be not a bad alternative.




Friday, April 11, 2014

10/4/2014: The curse of Long-Term Joblessness


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from March 30, 2014


The unemployment crisis has not passed unnoticed in many households. Ours’ is no exception. Back in 2008, for a brief period of time, both of us found ourselves out of jobs. Thankfully, the spell was very short-lived. Then, in 2011, over a couple of months, I was dusting out my CV for unplanned updates. Just a few days ago, I learned that this year I will not be teaching two of the courses I have taught over the recent years. It's part-time unemployment, again, and this time it is down not to the economic crisis, but to the senile EU 'labour protection' laws.

Yet, spared long-term unemployment spells and able to pick up freelance and contract work, our family is a lucky one. In contrast, many in Ireland today find themselves in an entirely different camp.

Per latest statistics, in February 2014, 180,496 individuals were officially in receipt of Live Register supports for longer than 1 year. Inclusive of those long-term unemployed who were engaged in state-run 'activation programmes' there were around 265,500 people who were seeking employment and not finding one for over a year.

Countless more, discouraged by the zero prospect of securing a new job and not eligible or no longer eligible (having run out of benefits and not qualifying for full social welfare due to total family income) for Live Register supports have dropped out of the workforce and/or emigrated. They simply vanished from the official statistics counts. By latest counts, their numbers can range around 250,000; half of these coming from emigrants who left the country between April 2010 and April 2013.


The numbers above starkly contrast with the boisterous claims by the Government that the economy has created some 61,000 new jobs in 2013. Looking deeper into the new jobs claim, there has been a tangible rise in full-time employment of roughly 27,000 in 2013. Which is still a good news, just not good enough to make a serious dent in the long-term unemployment figures.

Officially, year on year, long-term unemployment fell by 20,900 in Q4 2013. Accounting for those in activation programmes, it was down by around 18,200. Live Register numbers are showing even shallower declines. In 12 months through February 2014, total number of unemployment supports recipients fell 30,807. But factoring in the effect of state training programmes, the decline was only 7,364 amongst those on live register for longer than 1 year. Even more worrisome, since Q1 2011 when the current Government took office, through the first two months of 2014, numbers of the long-term recipients of Live Register support are up by 31,352.

Whichever way you look at the figures, the conclusion is brutally obvious: the problem of long-term unemployment is actually getting worse just as the Government and the media are talking about rapid jobs creation. More ominously, with every month passing, those stuck in long-term joblessness lose skills, aptitude and sustain rising psychological stress.

All of this adds up to what economists identify across a number of studies as a long-term or nearly permanent loss of economic and social wellbeing for workers directly impacted by the long-term unemployment.

However, long-term unemployment also impacts many more individuals than the unemployed themselves.

The lifetime declines in career paths and incomes traceable to the long-term unemployment are also found across the groups related to those without the jobs either via family or via job market connections. Researchers in the US, UK, Germany and Denmark have shown that long-term unemployment for one member of the family leads to a reduction in the lifetime income and pensions cover for the entire household. Studies have also linked long-term unemployment of parents to poorer outcomes in education and jobs market performance for their children.

The adverse effects of long-term unemployment also occur much earlier in the out-of-work spell than our statistics allow for. Whilst we consider the unemployment spells of over 1 year to be the benchmark for long-term unemployment, studies from the US and UK show that the adverse effects kick in as early as six months after the job termination. The US-based Urban Institute found that being out of work for a period in excess of six months is "associated with lower well-being among the long-term unemployed, their families, and their communities. Each week out of work means more lost income. The long-term unemployed also tend to earn less once they find new jobs. They tend to be in poorer health and have children with worse academic performance than similar workers who avoided unemployment. Communities with a higher share of long-term unemployed workers also tend to have higher rates of crime and violence."

This is a far cry from the Irish Government rhetoric on the issue of long term unemployment that paints the picture of relatively isolated, largely personal effects of the problem. Empirical evidence from a number of European countries, as well as the US and Australia shows that these effects are directly attributable to the unemployment spells themselves, rather than being driven by the same causative factors that may contribute to a person becoming unemployed.

Such evidence directly disputes the validity of the Irish Government policies that rely almost entirely on so-called 'activation programmes'. Activation programmes put in place in Ireland during this crisis primarily aim at providing disincentives for the unemployed to stay outside the labour market. Such programmes can be effective in the case where there is significant voluntary unemployment. Instead, in the environment with shortages of jobs and big mismatches between skills and jobs, policy emphasis should be on providing long-term supports to acquire necessary skills and empower unemployed to gradually transition into new professions, enterprises and self-employment.

In part, our state training programmes are falling short of closing the skills gaps that do exist in the labour markets. ICT and ICT support services training, as well as international financial services and professional services skills – including those in sales, marketing, back office operations - are barely covered by the existent programmes.

And where they are present, their quality is wanting. For a good reason: much of our training at best involves instructors who are part-time employed in the sectors of claimed expertise and are too often on the pre-retirement side of their careers, having already fallen behind the curve in terms of what is needed in the markets. In worst cases, training is supplied by those who have no proven track record in the market. Structuring of courses and programmes is done by public sector employees who have little immediate understanding of what is being demanded. We should rely less on the use of training 'specialists' and more on industry-based apprenticeships.

Many practices today substitute applied teaching in a quasi-educational programme with class-based instructions and formal qualification attainment for an hands-on, on-site engagement with actual employers. Evidence collected in Denmark during the 1990s showed that classroom-based training programmes significantly increase individual unemployment rates instead of decreasing them. The reason for this is that attainment of formal or highly specialised qualifications tends to increase individual expectations of wages offers post-programme completion, reducing the range of jobs for which they apply. This evidence in part informed the German reforms of the early 2000s that focused on on-the-job apprenticeship-based skills development. Beyond that, class-based training lacks incentives for self-advancement, such as performance bonuses and commissions.

Self-employment acts as a major springboard to new business formation and can lead to acquisition of skills necessary for full-time employment in the future. Currently, there is little training and support available for people who are considering self-employment. There are, however, strong disincentives to undertake self-employment inherent in our tax systems, access to benefits, and in reduced burden of legal compliance. One possible cross-link between self-employment training and larger enterprises' demand for contractors is not explored in the current training programmes. There are no available shared services platforms that can help self-employed and budding entrepreneurs reduce costs in the areas of accounting, legal and marketing.


Unless we are willing to sustain the indefinitely some 100,000-120,000 in long-term unemployment, we need to rethink of the entire approach to skills development, acquisition and deployment in this country.

Some recent proposals in this area include calls from the private sector employers groups to drop minimum wage. This can help, but in the current environment of constrained jobs supply, it will mean more hardship for families, in return for potentially only marginal gains in employment. Incentivising self-employment and contracting work, by reducing tax penalties will probably have a larger impact. Encouraging, supporting and incentivising real internships and apprenticeships - based on equal pay, commensurable with experience and productivity - will benefit primarily younger workers and workers with proximate skills to those currently in demand. Backing such programmes with deferred tax credits for employers, accessible after, say 3 years of employing new workers, will be a big positive.

In addition we need to review our current system of job-search assistance. For starters, this should be provided by professional placement and search firms, not by State agencies.

Finally, we need to review our current definition of the long-term unemployed to cover all those who are out of the job for longer than 6 months, as well as those who moved into unemployment fro, being self-employed.


This week, former White House economist Alan Krueger identified US long-term unemployment in the US as the "most serious problem" the economy faces right now. He is right. Yet, in the US, long-term unemployed represent roughly one third of all those receiving unemployment assistance. In Ireland, the number currently stands at almost two thirds. The crisis has not gone away. Neither should the drive for reforms.





Box-out: 

With the opening of the first Bitcoin ATMs in Dublin and with growing number of companies taking payments in the world's most popular crypto currency, the crypto-currency became a flavour of the week for financial press in Ireland.

The most hotly debated financial instrument in the markets, it is generating mountains of comments, rumors, as well as serious academic, industry and policy papers. Is it a currency? A commodity, like gold - limited in supply, unlimited in demand? Or a Ponzi scheme?

Few agree as to the true nature of Bitcoin. Bank of Finland denied Bitcoin a status of money, defining it as a commodity of sorts. Norway followed the suit, while Denmark is still deliberating. Sweden classified Bitcoin as 'another asset' proximate to art and antiques, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service - as property.The European Banking Authority is clearly not a fan, having ruled that "when using virtual currency for commercial transactions, consumers are not protected by any refund rights under EU law." In contrast, German authorities recognise Bitcoin as 'a unit of account' as do the French.

Financially, Bitcoin is neither a commodity nor a currency. Bitcoin does not share in any of the main features of commodities. You can't take a physical delivery under an insured contract. You cannot use it to hedge any other asset classes, such as stocks or other currencies. And it is not a currency because it has no issuer who guarantees its value. Nor can it feasibly serve as a unit of accounting and store of value, given extreme levels of price volatility.

Thus, one of the more accurate ways is to think of Bitcoin as a very exciting, interesting (from speculative, academic and practitioner point of view) financial instrument. For now, it shares some properties common to the dot.com stocks of around 1996-1998 and Dutch tulips ca 1620-1630, the periods before the full mania hit, but already showing the signs of some excessive investor confidence. So plant your seed with care.

Thursday, December 8, 2011

08/12/2011: An even greater threat

Here's an even greater threat to Ireland's 'economic model' - the one based on attempting to attract into this country a new generation of FDI - FDI that is increasingly based on human capital-intensive activities.

BBC report here covers increasing mobility of skills across the borders (link). And I co-authored recently a report on this (here).

But Ireland, folks, is not a serious contender for this capital due to the confluence of the following trends here and abroad:

  1. Our taxes on top earnings - earnings associated with higher human capital, once we remove the egregiously high salaries at the top of the public sector bureaucracies and in sheltered private/semi-state sectors;
  2. Our quality of public services that can be meaningfully utilized by people with higher human capital is not up to scratch - in health, education, transport, urban amenities, cultural amenities and Government services;
  3. Our quality of promotional opportunities within the country is restricted, especially for foreign talent due to archaic promotion practices and cronyism; and
  4. Our quality of public discourse, when it comes to higher earners is toxic - in part justified by absurdities of our top public sector brass who enjoy earnings well in excess of their talents, and in part justified by our absurd 'bankers' whose performance in the past is also unmatched to their earnings.
So we are witnessing an outflow of key talent from Ireland. In recent months a large number of high quality academic researchers have packed up and left (or currently leaving) this country. In a number of sectors - including the 'flagship' ICT services sector - we are seeing jobs moving after key workers (not key executives, as our Government mistakenly thinks, judging by the special measures in the Budget 2012, but key skills-holders). In a number of sectors, we are failing to develop critical mass of skills and activities due to lack of talent - one example would be funds management in IFSC, the area where policymakers have been trying to build activity for some 5 years now.

Now, we might think that these issues should be priority number 734 or so on the list, given the gravity of our crisis, but they are not. Long term competitiveness no longer rests on simplified harmonized indicators for brawn labour, but on yet-to-be-compiled indicators of our human capital pool. And here, mass-produced degrees with plausible-sounding names of poorly ranked institutions on them won't do the job. Ireland is facing two roads ahead: one road leads to a low wage, low income autarky of skills, another to a high wage, high income open skills economy. So far, our policy wheels are pointed firmly in the direction of the former.

Thursday, November 17, 2011

17/11/2011: INTO is correct on JobBridge Scheme

INTO has issued a direction to its members not to co-operate with the Government's JobBridge scheme. The details are reported here.

While I extremely rarely find myself in agreement with INTO, this time around I think their position is compelling. If JobBridge scheme were to be used in the case of teaching staff, then this means that there are:

  1. Teaching positions unfilled (otherwise how can a JobBridge position materialise), 
  2. Teachers with incomplete qualifications who can benefit from on-the-job training, and
  3. There are no teachers who are fully qualified and are unemployed.
It appears that this is not the case. Per INTO, there are unemployed qualified teachers (violating 3 above) and there are, supposedly, no vacancies to employ these qualified teachers (condition 1 violated). In this environment.

If there are positions that are unfilled in the presence of unemployed teachers, these unemployed teachers should be hired with normal pay to do their jobs. 

If there are no positions unfilled, and the schools want to create new positions, there should be no discrimination between those coming into the new jobs that are identical to existent jobs in terms of responsibilities.

The JobBridge scheme should not be used to employ people doing normal work at lower pay. It should only be used to provide skills training in very limited set of circumstances where apprenticeships are suitable. In fact, we need a real apprenticeship schemes, not a JobBridge scheme.